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NOTES 
Proprietary Duties of the Federal Government Under the 
Public Land Trust 
The federal government, as owner of one third of the nation's 
land,1 is responsible for land management decisions that have pro-
found economic,2 social,3 and environmental4 consequences. Yet the 
government has failed to develop a comprehensive policy for adminis-
tering the public lands. 5 Consequently, this important resource has 
1. U.S. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW CoMMN., ONE THIRD OF TIIE NATION'S 
LAND 19 (1970) [hereinafter cited as PLLRC]. The federal government owns ap-
proximately 761 million acres of land, U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, PUBLIC 
LAND STATISTICS 10 (1974), of which almost 725 million acres-an area the size of 
India-are commonly thought of as the public lands. See PLLRC, supra, at 19. 
This Note concentrates on the 643 million acres of public land under the jurisdiction 
of the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management. See note 15 infra. 
103.35 million acres of public land in Alaska are in the process of being trans-
ferred to the state. See Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 6, 72 Stat. 339 
(1958), as amended by Act of Sept. 14, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-786, 74 Stat. 1025, 
Act of March 24, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-289, 78 Stat. 168. In addition, 38 million 
acres are being conveyed to Alaskan natives. See Alaska Native Claims Settlement 
Act§ 12(c), 43 U.S.C. § 1611(c) (Supp. V 1975). 
2. In 1973, gross receipts from the sale of public land resources exceeded $788 
million. See U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 168 
(1973); U.S. FOREST SERVICE, REPORT OF THE CHIEF 53 (1973). This total would 
rank the public lands, as an economic entity, at number 207 on the Fortune 500. See 
FORTUNE, May, 1974, at 240; Clawson, Economic Aspects of Public Lands, in 
AMERICA'S PUBLIC LANDS: PoLmcs, EcoNOMICS AND ADMINISTRATION 46 (H. Na-
than ed. 1972). 
The public lands, in 1973, produced approximately 11 million board feet of lum-
ber, 176 million barrels of petroleum, one trillion cubic feet of natural gas, 594 
million gallons of gasoline and liquid petroleum gas, 14 million short tons of coal, 
13 million short tons of potash, and 19 million animal-unit-months of livestock for-
age. See U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, supra, at 73-109: U.S. FOREST SER· 
VICE, supra, at 33-37. In general, the federal lands account for 35 percent of the 
nation's oil and gas reserves and 50 per cent of the nation's coal reserves. FORD 
FOUNDATION, EXPLORING ENERGY CHOICES 29 (1974). 
3. In 1973, recreational use of public lands totaled approximately 230 million 
visitor-days. See U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, supra note 2, at 83; U.S. 
FOREST SERVICE, supra note 2, at 20-21. This is approximately one visitor-day per 
American citizen. 
4. For example, open space and wildlife habitats exist across most of the public 
lands, and special programs run by the federal government protect many endangered 
species that live in these areas. See U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, supra note 
1, at 76; U.S. FOREST SERVICE, REPORT OF nm CHIEF 3 (1975). 
5. See Public Land Law Review Commission Act§ 2, 43 U.S.C. § 1392 (1970): 
[T]he public land laws of the United States have developed over a long period 
of years through a series of Acts of Congress which are not fully correlated with 
each other and . • • those laws, or some of them, may be inadequate to meet 
the current and future needs of the American people • • • . 
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not contributed its full potential to the national welfare. 6 
All three branches of government have contributed to the neglect 
of the public lands. Congress, which is authorized under article IV 
of the Constitution to administer the public lands, 7 has, by its own 
admission, 8 performed this task inadequately. Last year, Congress 
finally passed the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 
(FLPMA), 9 which addressed the problems identified earlier by the 
Public Land Law Review Commission, 10 but the provisions of the 
Act are so vague that many problems remain unresolved.11 Because 
Congress did not enact this law until six years after the Commission 
issued its report, more specific statutory reform does not appear likely 
in the near future. 12 
In the absence of strong congressional leadership, administrative 
agencies have made most land management decisions under the au-
See also S. REP. No. 583, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25 (1976); PLLRC, supra note 
1, at 2-3. 
6. See PLLRC, supra note 1, at 3. For example, the government loses potential 
revenue because it sells resources for less than market value, see note 97 infra, and 
because it is an inefficient manager, see Clawson, supra note 2, at 50-54. The value 
of the land as a recreational and environmental resource has declined as a result of 
overgrazing, see note 99 infra and accompanying text, and poorly regulated mining, 
see U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ANN. REP. 234-35 (1975). Pro-
posed remedies for these and other problems have long been available. See, e.g., M. 
CLAWSON & B. HELD, THE FEDERAL LANDS 27 (1957). 
7. U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. See Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273 
(1954); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911). 
8. See S. REP. No. 1444, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1964); H.R. REP. No. 1008, 
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1963); note 5 supra. 
9. 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-82 (Pamphlet No. 4, pt. 3, Dec. 1976). 
10. See note 5 supra. Congress created the Public Land Law Review Commis-
sion in 1964 to serve as an expert advisory body for the formulation of comprehen-
sive land use policies. See Public Land Law Review Commission Act, 43 U.S.C. 
§§ 1391-400 (1970). In a 1970 report to Congress, the Commission made 137 major 
recommendations, together with many subsidiary recommendations, covering all 
facets of public land administration except water law. See PLLRC, supra note 1. 
11. The fundamental issues in public land administration concern the resolution 
of inconsistent land management objectives. See PLLRC, supra note 1, at 47-48; H. 
R. REP. No. 1008, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1963). In the 1976 Act, Congress 
avoided these issues by delegating land use decisions to the Department of the In-
terior, ordering it to prepare "land use plans which provide by tracts or areas for 
the use of the public lands." 43 U.S.C.A. § 1712(a) (Pamphlet No. 4, pt. 3, Dec. 
1976). Section 202(c) of the Act, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1712(c) (Pamphlet No. 4, pt. 3, 
Dec. 1976), provides some standards to be used in preparing these plans, but they 
are so general that they give little guidance in making a land use plan for a specific 
tract of public land-for example, in determining the relative importance of environ-
mental protection and meat production. The general land use policies articulated 
in the Act, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1701(a) (Pamphlet No. 4, pt. 3, Dec. 1976), are also too 
broad to provide meaningful guidance in making concrete land use plans. 
12. Congress enacted The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 42 
U.S.C.A §§ 1701-82 (Pamphlet No. 4, pt. 3, Dec. 1976), in answer to the problems 
identified by the Public Land Law Review Commission in its 1970 report to Con-
gress. See S. REP. No. 583, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 35-36 (1975). Thus, it is possible 
that many congressmen believe that existing public land problems have been solved. 
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thority of broad, vague statutes.13 Although the agencies appear to 
have been more diligent in coordinating their management programs 
in recent years, 14 diffusion of responsibility15 and outdated statutes10 
have prevented the development of a comprehensive national land use 
policy.17 Commendably, the FLPMA eliminates many of the obso-
lete statutes. Its chief defect, however, is that in some areas it simply 
delegates to the land management agencies the authority to act upon 
difficult issues without providing them with any meaningful standards 
for the development of policy.18 
Courts, reluctant to interfere with administrative and legislative 
discretion in public land administration, have not been an effective 
check on the performance of these branches of government. 10 Nev-
13. E.g., Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-31 (1970); 
Taylor Grazing Act, 43 U.S.C. 315 (1970). See PLLRC, supra note 1, at 42: "In 
the absence of legislative statements of policy objectives and appropriate priority 
rankings, the land management agencies have formulated their own goals." See also 
C. REICH, BUREAUCRACY AND THE FORESTS 11-12 (1962); Heyman, Land Planning 
on Public l.Ands: The PLLRC Report, 6 LAND & WATER L. REV. 387, 398-99 (1970); 
Weiner, The Public Land Law Review Commission Report-The Federal Timber Re• 
sources, 4 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 195, 202-03 (1971); Comment, The Conservation-
ists and the Public l.Ands: Administrative and Judicial Remedies Relating to the Use 
and Disposition of the Public l.Ands Administered by the Department of the Interior, 
68 MICH. L. REV. 1200, 1243 (1970). 
14. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 
829, 832 (D.D.C. 1974), affd. mem., 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (court de-
scribes the Bureau of Land Management's recently established program of inventory-
ing and planning livestock grazing). The National Environmental Policy Act of 
1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970), has forced all agencies to carry out more orderly 
planning. 
15. Various federal agencies have direct responsibilities for federal lands. They 
include the Bureau of Land Management (457 million acres plus 313 million acres 
of reserved subsurface mineral rights), the Forest Service (186 million acres), the 
Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife (28.5 million acres), and the Park Service 
(31 million acres). See PLLRC, supra note 1 at 323-24; U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL QUALITY ANN. REP. 243 (1975). The Forest Service is in the Department 
of Agriculture; the other three agencies with direct responsibility for public land ad-
ministration are in the Department of the Interior. A number of other agencies also 
are involved in federal land management, including the Federal Energy Administra-
tion, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Bureau of Reclamation, the Bureau of 
Mines, and the Department of Defense. See PLLRC, supra note 1, at 20-22, 327-
34. Significantly, the Public Land Law Review Commission "discovered problems 
caused by the lack of coordination between public land agencies in nearly every 
aspect of public land policy." PLLRC, supra note 1, at 42. 
16. See, e.g., statutes repealed by the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, §§ 702-06, 90 Stat. 2787-93 (1976). 
11. See PLLRC, supra note 1, at 282. See generally M. CLAWSON & B. HELD, 
supra note 6, at 338-39. 
18. See note 11 supra & text at notes 162-63 infra. 
19. See, e.g., Mollohan v. Gray, 413 F.2d 349, 352 (9th Cir. 1969): 
The Taylor Grazing Act gives the Secretary of the Interior broad powers. • • . 
In light of [this], we believe the Taylor Grazing Act 15 a permissive type stat-
ute: issuance or nonissuance [of grazing permits], including refusal to renew 
or cancellation, is committed to agency discretion by the statute. • . . Thus, the 
administrative decision involved in the case at bar is exempted from judicial re-
view •..• 
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ertheless, the judiciary offers considerable promise for reform. Past 
experience indicates that the courts can respond more quickly to 
changed circumstances than can other branches of government, 20 and 
that the judiciary is relatively free from interest group pressure, 21 
which has been a major impediment to congressional and agency 
action.22 Moreover, the FLPMA's substantial delegation of power to 
the land management agencies makes the need for increased judicial 
supervision of public land administration all the more compelling. 23 
This Note examines one mechanism by which the courts might 
supervise public land administration: the common-law public land 
trust. 24 It contends that by implementing this trust, which is a means 
of enforcing the government's responsibility for property held in a 
proprietary capacity, the courts can rectify their neglect of the public 
lands without overstepping the boundaries of permissible judicial 
See Montgomery, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law: Its Application 
in the Judicial Review of Land Classification Decisions, 8 WILLAMETTE L.J. 135, 
144-50 (1972); Comment, supra note 13, at 1243; Note, The Government as Pro-
prietor: The Private Use of Public Property, 55 VA. L. REV. 1079, 1079 (1969). 
But cf. Citizens To Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410, 413 (1971) 
(broad judicial review of agency action in nonpublic land context); Barlow v. Collins, 
397 U.S. 159, 167 (1970) (broad judicial review of agency action in nonpublic land 
context). 
20. Courts often issue orders and injunctions that take effect immediately. In 
contrast are the bureaucratic problems that hinder expeditious action even within one 
agency. See M. CLAWSON & B. HELD, supra note 6, at 157-60. For example, the 
Bureau of Land Management and the Forest Service created the Interdepartment 
Grazing Fees Committee in 1960. Although a complex study of grazing fees was 
undertaken, only background work was accomplished until 1966, and revised fee 
schedules were not promulgated until 1968. See Hearings on Grazing Fees Before 
the Subcomm. on Public Lands of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 122-24 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 House Hearings]. 
Congress could act quickly if the public were to demand it, but the public lands do 
not figure prominently in the political arena. See M. CLAWSON & B. HELD, supra 
note 6, at 135. 
21. See Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeal: The Threat to 
the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542, 552 (1969); 
Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Court, 122 U. PA. L. 
REV. 509, 517 (1974). The judiciary derives relative immunity to interest group 
pressure, as compared to Congress and administrative agencies, from its security re-
garding both tenure and appropriations. See generally note 96 infra. 
22. See note 96 infra & text at notes 121-36 infra. 
23. See 43 U.S.C.A. § 1701(a)(6) (Pamphlet No. 4, pt. 3, Dec. 1976). See also 
notes 96, 106 infra. 
24. For cases discussing the common-law public land trust, see Alabama v. Texas, 
347 U.S. 272, 273 (1954); United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 28 (1940); 
Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409 (1919); Causey v. 
United States, 240 U.S. 399, 402 (1916); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 
(1911); Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 524 (1897); Knight v. United 
States Land Assn., 142 U.S. 161, 181 (1891); United States v. Trinidad Coal & 
Coking Co., 137 U.S. 160, 170 (1890); United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338, 342 
(1888); Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593, 597 (10th Cir. 19.72); Sierra Club 'V. Dept. 
of the Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284, 287 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Sierra Club v. Dept. of the 
Interior, 376 F. Supp. 90, 93 (N.D. Cal. 1974). 
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involvement. 25 The trust doctrine is particularly valuable in this 
context because it is a source of substantive standards in situations 
where statutes provide little guidance. Vitalization of the public 
land trust, which is distinct from the more commonly known public 
trust,26 would have many ramifications,27 but this Note will focus 
upon one of them: the government's duty to secure fair market value 
from sales and leases of public land resources. 
I. THE EXISTENCE OF THE- PUBLIC LAND TRUST 
Although judicial discourse on the public land trust doctrine is 
relatively scarce, the Supreme Court has indicated on many occasions 
that such a trust does in fact exist. 28 It might be argued that these 
early cases, because they always referred to the government's role as 
trustee in the context of validating governmental action, are authority 
only for the existence of a power, not a duty. However, the language 
of these early Supreme Court cases goes far beyond the ordinary 
constitutional or statutory rationales that might be invoked to support 
a governmental action. Illustrative is the language in United States v. 
Trinidad Coal & Coking Co., 29 a case involving the sale by the 
government of vacant coal lands: "[The lands] were held in trust for 
all the people; and in making regulations for disposing of them, 
Congress . . . , in the discharge of a high public duty and in the 
interest of the whole country, sought to develop the material resources 
of the United States .... "30 Any doubts about the strength of 
these early decisions should also have been alleviated by three recent 
lower court decisions that reaffirmed the trust's existence.31 Al-
25. Two justifications for the judicial refusal to become involved in public land 
administration have been offered. First, it has been argued that there exists no 
doctrine that provides a sound basis for judicial supervision. See Montgomery, 
supra note 19, at 178. This Note contends that the common-law public land trust 
provides a principled basis for judicial review of public land administration. 
Second, the complex technical issues and policy determinations presented by 
public land controversies can be viewed as removing the administration of such con-
troversies from the ambit of proper judicial review. See Comment, supra note 13, 
at 1246; cf. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974) (judicial refusal to 
review prison administration). However, this position has been rejected by some 
commentators in the closely related environmental area. See Leventhal, supra note 
21, at 532-35. See also Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis in the Courts: Judicial Review 
Under NEPA, 9 GA. L. REV. 417, 417-20 (1975). Thus, judicial refusal to review 
public land administration without consideration of the public land trust remains un-
warranted. 
26. See text at notes 76-86 infra. 
21. See text at notes 69-74 infra. 
28. See cases cited note 24 supra. 
29. 137 U.S. 160 (1890). 
30. 137 U.S. at 170. 
31. Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593, 597 (10th Cir. 1972); Sierra Club v. Dept. 
of the Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284, 287 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Sierra Club v. Dept. of the 
Interior, 376 F. Supp. 90, 93 (N.D. Cal. 1974). 
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though none of them specifically addressed the question whether a 
public land trust exists, in each case the court, citing the earlier 
Supreme Court cases, assumed the trust's existence as a prerequisite 
to its holding. In two cases, both of which arose from the same facts 
and were reported as Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior,32 the 
court cited both the public land trust33 and Indian trust34 precedents 
to support its holding that the government's duty as trustee of Red-
wood National Park transformed a statute that merely authorized 
agency action into one that compelled such action. 35 In Davis v. Mor-
ton, 36 the Tenth Circuit held that the government's fiduciary obliga-
tions under an Indian trust did not prevent the application of the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 196937 to the government's 
approval, as trustee, of an Indian building project. Otherwise, the 
court reasoned, the government's fiduciary responsibility for the public 
lands would similarly prevent NEPA jurisdiction over the public 
domain. 38 Thus, the Davis and the Sierra Club cases demonstrate that 
the early Supreme Court decisions concerning the existence of the 
public land trust are still viable. 
II. THE NATURE OF THE PuBLIC LAND TRUST 
Since the existence issue has received rather limited attention by 
the courts, it is not surprising that courts have given little considera-
tion to the nature of the public land trust. Its nature can be deter-
mined by analyzing the specific duties that the trust imposes upon the 
government and the role of the courts in enforcing the trust. Because 
the extent of judicial supervision determines the impact of the trust, 
this issue will be considered first. 
32. 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975); 376 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974). 
33. See, e.g., Knight v. United States Land Assn., 142 U.S. 161, 181 (1891). 
34. Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1971 ). 
35. 398 F. Supp. at 289, 293; 376 F. Supp. at 93, 95-96. In the 1975 decision, 
the Sierra Club court apparently recognized a special governmental trust for National 
Parks: 
[T]here is . . . a general trust duty imposed upon the National Park Service, 
Department of the Interior, by the National Park System Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1 et 
seq., to conserve scenery and natural and historic objects and wildlife [in the 
National Parks, Monuments and reservations] and to provide for the enjoyment 
of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired 
for the enjoyment of future generations . . . . 
398 F. Supp. at 287 (citation omitted). This development is consistent with the 
thesis of this Note that governmental trusts are appropriate land management tools, 
see text at notes 46-51 infra, and that these trusts should be tailored to fit the uses 
and potential uses of particular categories of publicly owned land, see text at notes 
75-86 infra. 
36. 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972). 
37. 42 u.s.c. §§ 4321-47 (1970). 
38. 469 F.2d at 597. 
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A. The Extent of Judicial Review 
The public land trust, because it is a creation of the common law 
and is not constitutionally based, is subordinate to statutory enact-
ments. The Supreme Court has held that congressional enactments 
cannot be ignored on the ground that they are inconsistent with the 
purpose of the trust: "The power over the public lands thus entrusted 
to Congress is without limitations. 'And it is not for the courts to say 
how that trust shall be administered. That is for Congress to deter-
mine.' "39 Although this language might be read to preclude judicial 
review of any governmental action concerning the public lands, a 
conclusion that would vitiate the trust, subsequent cases make it clear 
that the Court was referring only to review of congressional action. 40 
Thus, judicial review can be obtained for governmental action that is 
not specifically controlled by statute, such as discretionary acts of the 
executive branch. Since most public land policy is made by agencies 
acting pursuant to broad delegations of discretionary authority,41 
limiting the scope of review to agency action42 should not signifi-
cantly impair the impact of the trust. Judicial review is similarly con-
strained with respect to the analogous public trust43 and Indian 
trusts;44 nevertheless, courts have successfully used those doctrines to 
improve the government's performance. 45 
Professor Sax has fully developed this theory of "limited review" 
in the context of the public trust. 46 The basic rule is that courts 
39. Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273 (1954), quoting United States v. San 
Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29-30 (1940), and Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 539 
(1911). 
40. See Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 338 n.7 (1963); 
Coleman v. United States, 363 F.2d 190, 195 (9th Cir. 1966). See also Alabama 
v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 277 (1954) (Reed, J., concurring) ("Such congressional de-
termination .•. is not subject to judicial review") (emphasis added). 
41. See notes 11, 13 supra. 
42. The Administrative Procedure Act precludes judicial review of "agency action 
[that] is committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1970). The Su-
preme Court, however, has severely restricted this exception to the general review-
ability of agency action. See Citizens To Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 
402, 410 (1971); Barlow v: Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 167 (1970) (judicial review unless 
"'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrazy legislative intent"). See also text at 
notes 47-58 infra. Thus, general considerations concerning judicial review of agency 
actions present no obstacle to review of agency administration of public lands. 
Sovereign immunity also presents little problem for judicial review based on the 
public land trust. See Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Fed-
eral Administrative Action: Some Conclusions from the Public Land Cases, 68 
1 MICH. L. REv. 867, 909 (1970). See also Comment, supra note 13, at 1226-32. 
43. See, e.g., Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective 
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471, 494-95 (1970). 
44. Compare Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942) (ju-
dicial review of agency action), with Chippewa Indians v. United States, 307 U.S. 
1, 3-5 (1939) (no judicial review of Congressional action). 
45. See Sax, supra note 43, at 498. 
46. See id. at 492-502, 557-61. 
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should overturn any agency action that breaches the trust unless the 
legislature has enacted a statute that explicitly authorizes the action. 47 
Although this seems simple enough, a conflict between competing 
policies occurs when a court is required to determine whether a 
statute that an agency insists authorizes its action is sufficiently 
explicit to override the trust. Because the trust is not constitutionally 
based, the legislature can, in effect, breach the trust by passing a 
statute that repudiates its objects.48 However, unless the legislature's 
unreviewable power to override the trust is kept within certain limits, 
the trust will have no impact. The only way that courts can satisfac-
torily resolve this conflict is to enforce statutes that breach the trust, 
but to interpret them very narrowly, thereby forcing Congress, if it 
desires to override the trust, to do so publicly and explicitly. 49 Re-
quiring Congress to limit the trust in this manner seems highly 
desirable, since the American theory of national government assumes 
that the political process adequately protects the public interest when 
issues are openly confronted. 50 By recognizing the trust and employ-
ing a rule of narrow statutory construction, the courts will be able 
to oversee public land decisionmaking without infringing upon the 
41. See, e.g., Robbins v. Department of Pub. Works, 355 Mass. 328, 331-32, 244 
N.E.2d 577, 580 (1969); cf. United States v. Groen, 72 F. Supp. 713, 719 (D.D.C. 
1947) (use of public trust analysis and precedents without use of term "public 
trust"). 
48. See Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273 (1954). 
'49. See Sax, supra note 43, at 558-59; Comment, supra note 13, at 1252. 
50. It should be noted, however, that the primary problem with agency administra-
tion of the public lands-interest group pressure, see note 96 infra & text at notes 
121-36 infra-which could be alleviated by a vitalization of the public land trust, see 
note 106 infra & text at notes 140-43 infra, also exists to some degree in Congress. 
See B. CRoss, THE LEGISLATIVE STRUGGLE 22-25 (1953); note 96 infra. Thus, nar-
rowly construing Congressional statutes on the basis of the public land trust may do 
little more than shift the focus of interest group pressure from the federal agencies 
to Congress. With the agencies prohibited by the trust from administering the public 
lands in conformance with interest group desires, interest groups would attempt to 
pressure Congress into explicitly overriding the trust by statute. However, Congress 
should be less susceptible than the agencies to interest group pressure for several rea-
sons. First, agency administration of the public lands is characterized by low visibil-
ity. In contrast, Congressional decision-making is open to public scrutiny and tends 
to receive more publicity than do agency decisions. See Sax, supra 43, at 559-60. 
See also T. LowI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 307-09 (1969). Second, Congress does 
not have the time to make concessions to interest groups on specific matters. For 
example, Congress reacted to the rancher lobby's desire to have statutory limits on 
grazing fees by directing the Department of the Interior to make a study of the area. 
See Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 § 401(a), 43 U.S.C.A. § 
1751 (a) (Pamphlet No. 4, pt. 3, Dec. 1976); note 107 supra. Third, the public land 
interest groups are probably the primary outside influence on the land management 
agencies, but they do not have such special status with Congress as a whole. Cf. 
P. APPLEBY, MORALITY AND ADMINISTRATION IN DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 166 
(1952) (client interest groups inevitably have special access in specialized agencies). 
Finally, the views of land management agency employees may be influenced by past 
jobs or potential future jobs in public land user industries. See id. at 173-74. In 
contrast, Congressmen have broader employment opportunities. 
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constitutional authority of Congress. Thus, the trust concept is a 
sophisticated compromise between judicial activism and judicial ab-
dication. 51 
The question whether statutes that conflict with the purposes of a 
governmental trust should be narrowly construed has not been raised 
in the public land trust cases. However, in another line of public 
land decisions, the courts have developed a rule analogous to the 
narrow construction approach: Grants of public land to private per-
sons are construed against the grantee. 52 Furthermore, decisions 
interpreting federal Indian trusts are consistent with the rule of 
narrow construction. 53 Since the scope of review question raises the 
same policy conflicts for all governmental trusts, 54 public trust and 
Indian trust cases are convincing precedents for public land trust 
analysis. Courts should adopt the approach used in these cases and 
should construe narrowly any statutes that encroach upon the public 
land trust. Under this interpretation, the exceedingly vague statutes 
that direct most public land administration55 will provide no protec-
tion for agencies that violate their trust duties. 
Once a court determines that an agency's public land manage-
ment decision is within the proper scope of judicial review, it must 
then decide upon a standard to test the validity of the agency's act. 
Section lO(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act66 requires the 
federal courts to "hold unlawful and set aside agency action . . . 
51. See Sax, supra note 43, at 558-59. 
52. See Great N. Ry. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 272 (1942); Shively v. 
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 10 (1894). 
53. See Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942); Chip-
pewa Indians v. United States, 307 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1939). 
54. All governmental trusts, as bases for judicial review of legislative and ad-
ministrative decisions, see text at notes 41-45 supra, raise issues concerning the allo• 
cation of decision-making authority among the three branches of government. 
Ultimate decision-making authority over the subjects protected by governmental 
trusts, such as the public interest and the welfare of Indians, rests with the legislative 
branch of the government. See text at notes 39, 47 supra. However, a governmental 
trust, as enforced by the judiciary, acts as a check on inherent weaknesses in the exer-
cise of legislative and administrative authority. In the case of the public trust, for 
example, the judiciary protects the public interest from the susceptibility to interest 
group pressures of legislatures and administrative agencies. See Sax, supra note 43, 
at 556-57; cf. text at notes 121-43 infra (public land trust). In the case of Indian 
trusts, the judiciary protects the welfare of Indians from the traditional insensitivity 
of majority rule to minority interests. See, e.g., Seminole Nation v. United States, 
316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942); Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1, 27-28 
(1886). Thus, with respect to the allocation of decision-making power and the scope 
of judicial review, the various types of governmental trusts are analogous to one an• 
other. It should be noted, however, that this is not necessarily true with respect to 
the trusts' substantive content. See text at notes 75-86 infra. 
55. See note 13 supra. A few old statutes explicitly specify actions that would 
otherwise violate the public land trust. See Mining Act of 1872 §§ 6, 11, 30 U.S.C. 
§§ 29, 37 (1970) (mining rights on the public lands leased for less than current mar• 
ket value). 
56. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970). 
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[that is] not in accordance with law." It is clear that a federal trust 
is a "law";67 accordingly, the standard of review is determined by trust 
law, particularly by the extent of a fiduciary's duty of care.58 
Most state laws require fiduciaries to exercise the judgment and 
care that "reasonable" people would exercise in similar circum- · 
stances. 59 However, because federal trusts are governed by federal 
law, 60 state law standards do not necessarily apply. Courts might 
accept the "reasonable person standard," or they might opt for a test 
less conducive to judicial supervision-such as abuse of discretion-
that would sustain almost all governmental land management deci-
sions. 61 Two courts that have addressed this issue with respect to 
Indian trusts have reached different conclusions. 62 One court held 
that "conduct of the government as trustee is measured by the same 
standards applicable to private trustees,"63 while the other declared 
that the government "is not to be held to the obligations of a technical 
trustee."64 
Since the cases fail to indicate what standard governs the activity 
of •a federal trustee, broader policy factors must be considered. One 
important advantage of the reasonable person standard is that it is 
widely used in other contexts and judges are already familiar with it. 
Furthermore, this standard presumably represents the wisdom of the 
common law's evolutionary resolution of the conflicting interests of 
trustees and beneficiaries. The alternative standard might deprive 
the trust of its protective significance. On the other hand, federal 
57. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1972). Significantly, 
Congress used the term "law" in section lO(e) while using the term "statute" in many 
other sections of the Administrative Procedure Act. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 703, 
704, 706(2) (c), (e) (1970). Thus, the fact that a federal trust is not a statutory 
Jaw is unimportant. See generally United States v. United States Alkali Export 
Assn., 86 F. Supp. 59, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). 
58. See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 256-
57 (D.D.C. 1972), revd. on other grounds, 499 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (agency 
action in breach of Indian trust "not in accordance with law"). 
59. See, e.g., !LL. ANN. STAT. ch. 148, § 105(1) (Supp. 1976) (prudent man 
rule); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 174 (1959). 
60. See United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 397 n.9 (1973); Manchester Band 
of Pomo Indians, Inc. v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238, 1243 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 
1973). 
61. The abuse of discretion standard applies even without the trust under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act§ lO(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (1970). 
62. The fact that Indian trusts are generally created by statute or treaty, see 
Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1886), does not distinguish 
them from the common-law public land trust with respect to judicial review of agency 
action under the Administrative Procedure Act § lO(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) 
(1970). See note 57 supra. 
63. Manchester Band of Pomo Indians, Inc. v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238, 
1245 (N.D. Cal. 1973). 
64. Fort Peck Indians v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 222, 223 (Ct. Cl. 1955). 
See also Chippewa Indians v. United States, 307 U.S. 1, 3 (1939). 
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agencies may lack the internal procedures and trained personnel 
necessary to meet strict fiduciary standards. The effort required to 
demonstrate compliance with the reasonable person standard might 
divert agency energies from important management tasks. The rea-
sonableness standard would also make access to the courts easier for 
those who seek to challenge agency actions; this would increase the 
workload of already overburdened courts, and would pressure judges 
to resolve highly technical disagreements. 65 
Although the arguments against a reasonableness standard merit 
some attention, they are not sufficiently strong to justify a standard 
that would effectively deny review in virtually all cases. Courts 
should tolerate the increase in cases66-which, in relative terms, 
would be minor-and agencies should accept greater burdens-
though the additional effort required would probably be 
miniscule67-if that would facilitate responsible agency behavior and 
would better protect the public interest. 68 In short, requiring the 
government as trustee of the public lands to meet a standard of 
reasonableness would be the most effective safeguard of the interests 
of the populace in the proper use of the public lands. 
B. Substantive Duties Under the Public Land Trust 
It is clear that courts may strike down agency decisions that are 
inconsistent with the purposes of the public land trust. Hence, it is 
65. See note 25 supra. 
66. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882); Carrington, supra note 
21, at 550, 568. 
67. Assuming that agency actions involving the public lands are major federal 
actions, the increase in agency paperwork necessary to satisfy a "reasonable man" 
standard of judicial review should not be significant; the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970), already requires federal agencies 
to plan and justify all "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of 
the human environment." 
68. Indeed, broadening the standard of review is one of the most important rea-
sons for recognizing the public land trust. Limited judicial review of agency action 
long has been available under the Administrative Procedure Act's "arbitrary, capri-
cious, or abuse of discretion" standard. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970). However, 
this narrow standard of review has had very little effect on agency behavior. See 
McKenna v. Seaton, 259 F.2d 780, 786 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 835 
(1958) (Prettyman, J., dissenting); Comment, supra note 13, at 1236-43. 
One might argue that the quality of decision-making of all executive agencies, not 
just those involved in public land administration, would benefit from expanded ju-
dicial review, and, thus, that there is no reason to single out administrative decisions 
covered by the public land trust. However, under a broad standard of review, the 
judicial process benefits from substantive standards as well as procedural standards, 
for these ensure that courts will do more than simply substitute their opinions for 
those of the decision-making agency. Basing a standard of broad judicial review on 
the common-law public land trust provides substantive standards of review, see text 
at notes 69-94 infra, as well as a mechanism by which to give continuity to evolving 
substantive standards. Thus, broad judicial review under the public land trust should 
be both more principled and more predictable than would be broad review of agency 
actions standing alone. See text at notes 140-43 infra, 
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necessary to return to the initial question regarding the trust's nature: 
What specific duties does the public land trust impose upon the 
government? The cases that establish the trust do not elaborate upon 
its content, 60 but general trust law, policy considerations, and justifi-
able 70 analogies to other kinds of governmental trusts suggest several 
duties that might appropriately attach to the public land trust: the 
general duty of care;71 the duty to disclose conflicting governmental 
interests;72 the duty to protect the trust corpus73 (the public lands); 
and the duty to secure fair market value from the sale or lease of 
public land resources. 74 This Note focuses upon only one of these 
duties: the fair market value requirement. 
Before proceeding with this analysis, however, one preliminary 
observation is necessary: When determining the court's proper role in 
enforcing the public land trust, it was useful to analogize the manner 
by which courts have enforced other kinds of governmental trusts. 
However, with respect to what substantive duties the courts may 
impose on the government through the public land trust, such analo-
gies may be inapt, since the responsibilities of government under the 
69. See Montgomery, supra note 19, at 159-60. 
70. See text at notes 75-86 infra. 
71. See Manchester Band of Pomo Indians, Inc. v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 
1238, 1245 (N.D.- Cal. 1973); G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS § 93 
(1973); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 174 (1959). 
72. See Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 364 F.2d 320, 323 (Ct. Cl. 
1966); G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 71, §§ 95-86; RESTATEMEN9 (SECOND) 
OF TRUSTS § 170(2) (1959). Conflicting proprietary and sovereign interests in the 
administration of the public lands are probably the rule rather than the exception. 
See PLLRC, supra note 1, at 45. The trust should not authorize ·courts to second-
guess the merits of the government's allocation of public land use between sovereign 
and proprietary objectives. But cf. note 120 infra (trust requires court to determine 
whether a particular land use has a proprietary or· sovereign objective). However, 
it should provide a basis for requiring federal agencies to disclose fully both the na-
ture and extent of the conflicting interests and the grounds used in determining a 
particular land use allocation. See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 
354 F. Supp. 252, 256 (D.D.C. 1972), revd. on other grounds, 499 F.2d 1095 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974); cf. Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99, 122-24 (D. Alas. 1971) (com-
plete agency discretion in absence of trust). 
73. See United States v. 111.2 Acres of Land, 293 F. Supp. 1042, 1047 n.2 (E.D. 
Wash. 1968), affd., 435 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1970); Federal Land Policy and Manage-
ment Act of 1976 § 102(a)(8), 43 U.S.C.A. § 1701 (a) (8) (Pamphlet No. 4, pt. 3, 
Dec. 1976); G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 71, § 99, cf. Bronken v. Morton, 473 
F.2d 790, 793 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 828 (1973) (national policy of con-
serving public domain and its resources). The duty to protect the trust corpus could 
lead to environmental remedies. For example, the duty might be used to require land 
management agencies to include reclamation clauses in mining leases. Under trust 
law, economic standards would determine the extent of reclamation that should be 
required. See G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 71, at 390-92. However, because 
the trust is not constitutionally based, Congress would remain free to fix a noneco-
nomic level of resource protection, either higher or lower, by statute. See text at 
note 39 supra. 
14. See Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 § 102(a)(9), 43 U.S. 
C.A. § 1701(a)(9) (Pamphlet No. 4, pt. 3, Dec. 1976); text at notes 112-14 infra. 
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusrs § 189 (1959). 
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public land trust may differ from those under other kinds of trusts. 7" 
In particular, confusion has been caused by the failure of some 
observers to distinguish the "public land trust" from the "public 
trust. "76 To understand the differences between the two trusts, it is 
necessary to distinguish the two types of federal land ownership-
sovereign and proprietary. 77 Sovereign property is held by the gov-
ernment for the use of the general populace. Historically, the cate-
gory has included navigable waters and submerged lands, 78 al-
though parkland has recently been added to it. 70 This kind of prop-
erty is subject to the "public trust,"80 the purposes of which include 
protection of the public's right of access to81 and free use of the prop-
erty for such activities as navigation and fishing, 82 promotion of 
recreational activities, and advancement of environmental objectives. 83 
In contrast, the government owns and manages proprietary property 
much as a private landowner would. The public has no automatic 
75. The scope of judicial review issue concerns the allocation of decision-making 
authority among the three branches of government; with respect to such allocation 
governmental trusts are analogous to one another. See note 54 supra. However, the 
issue of substantive duties under a governmental trust concerns the nature of the 
interest to be protected by the particular trust; the substantive duties under one gov-
ernmental trust will therefore not necessarily be analogous to the substantive duties 
imposed under a different governmental trust. See text at notes 76-86 infra. 
76. For a discussion of the public lands that fails to make this distinction, see 
Montgomery, supra note 19. 
11. See PLLRC, supra note 1, at 36-37. See also Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 
71, 78 (1821). 
18. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 13-17 (1894); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illi-
nois, 146 U.S. 387, 435-37 (1892). 
19. See Stephenson v. County of Monroe, 43 App. Div. 2d 897, 897, 351 N.Y.S. 
2d 232, 233 (1974). 
BO. See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 436-37. 452-54 (1892). For 
general discussion of the public trust, see Sax, supra note 43; Note, The Public Trust 
in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 19 YALE L.J. 762 
(1970). 
The states own most of the land subject to the public trust, but the federal govern-
ment owns some public trust property in the District of Columbia and on the outer 
continental shelf. The public trust is a federal as well as a state doctrine. See 
United States v. Groen, 72 F. Supp. 713, 719-20 (D.D.C. 1947) (use of state public 
trust precedents for federal land issue). 
81. Under the public trust's right of access, which may apply to the public lands, 
see text at note 120 infra, there may be a right to traverse intervening private land. 
See Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 308-09, 312-14, 294 A.2d 47, 54, 
56-51 (1972). See generally Comment, Access to Public Lands Across Intervening 
Private Lands, 1 LAND & WATER L. REV. 149 (1973). 
82. See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 413 (1842). 
83. See Muench v. Public Serv. Commn., 261 Wis. 492, 504-06, 53 N.W.2d 514, 
518-19, affd. on rehearing, 261 Wis. 515, 55 N.W.2d 40 (1952); Marks v. Whitney, 
6 Cal. 3d 251, 259-60, 491 P.2d 374, 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790, 796 (1971); Neptune 
City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 309-10, 294 A.2d 47, 54-55 (1972); Note, Ex-
panding the Definition of Public Trust Uses, 51 N.C.L. REV. 316 (1972). As a 
corollary to the right of access and use, the public trust also limits the government's 
power to alienate trust property because otherwise rights of use and access could b~ 
circumvented. See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 460 (1892). 
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right to use the government's proprietary property; in fact, an individ-
ual can be prosecuted for trespassing upon such property in appro-
priate circumstances.84 Traditionally, the public lands have been 
treated as proprietary property,85 and the public land trust has been 
employed to enforce the public's interest in the furtherance of pro-
prietary objectives, 86 such as revenue generation and resource exploi-
tation. Thus, the purposes of a trust should be carefully scrutinized 
before one concludes that the duties it imposes-such as the duty 
to s~cure fair market value-should also be imposed under the public 
land trust. 
1. The Example of Public Land Grazing 
The potential impact of requiring government agencies to secure 
fair market value for public land resources is illustrated by an actual 
controversy over a particular kind of public land resource pricing: 
public land grazing fees.87 Approximately 150 million acres of 
public land-an area nearly equal to the size of Texas-is currently 
used for livestock grazing.88 Until the early 1900s, grazing on this 
vast public range was completely unregulated. 80 Because there was 
no incentive for conservation, the land became seriously overgrazed: 00 
"To attempt to conserve forage was an invitation for others to come 
84. See Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911); Camfield v. United 
States, 167 U.S. 518, 524-25 (1897). 
85. See Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536 (1911); Camfield v. United 
States, 167 U.S. 518, 524 (1897). 
86. See Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1911) (trust supports pro-
prietary aspect of national forest management); Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 
518, 524 (1897); Knight v. United States Land Assn., 142 U.S. 161, 181 (1891). 
The public land trust also has been used to further the public's interest in advance-
ment of nonproprietary objectives, such as antitrust policy. See Causey v. United 
States, 240 U.S. 399, 402 (1916); United States v. Trinidad Coal & Coking Co., 137 
U.S. 160, 170 (1890). Thus, the public land trust can be interpreted as having both 
proprietary and nonproprietary aspects. However, in order to clarify the relative 
roles of the public trust and the public land trust, this Note treats the public land 
trust has having solely a proprietary function. This is desirable because the public 
trust has a reasonably well defined content that covers nonproprietary land uses more 
clearly and predictably than does the sparse nonproprietary content of the public 
land trust. 
87. Grazing fees are used only as an example. The current controversies over 
the government's return from coal leases and offshore oil leases may present facts 
similar to the grazing fees situation. See generally FoRD FOUNDATION, A TIME To 
CHOOSE 270, 286-89 (1975). 
88. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829, 831 
(D.D.C. 1974); PLLRC, supra note 1, at 105. 273 million acres of public land, 
more than one-third of the total acreage, is legally open to grazing. Id. 
89. See 1969 House Hearings, supra note 20, at 270-75; note 92 infra. See gen-
erally P. Foss, PoLmcs AND GRASS 3-38 (1960); E. PEFFER, THE CLOSING OF nm 
PuBLIC DoMAIN 8-71 (1951). 
90. See M. CLAWSON & B. HELD, supra note 6, at 57; P. Foss, supra note 89, 
at 32-35; E. PEFFER, supra note 89, at 97. 
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and get it."91 During this century the government has gradually 
increased its control over the range. One of the most significant 
developments was the initiation of the practice of charging ranchers 
fees for the right to use the range for livestock grazing. 02 Congress, 
through broad delegation statutes, 03 authorized the Forest Service 
and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the two agencies that 
oversee the federal range, to fix the level of such fees by administra-
tive rule. 94 Both agencies have long attempted to set these fees at 
market value, 95 but the ranching lobby has been quite successful in 
blocking fee increases.06 Consequently, the government currently 
91. U.S. FOREST SERVICE, REPORT OF nm CHIEF 3 (1953). 
92. The federal range is composed of land under the jurisdiction of both the For-
est Service and the Bureau of Land Management. See note 15 supra. Pursuant to 
the general delegation of authority in 16 U.S.C. § 471 (1970), the Forest Service 
promulgated grazing regulations and fees in 1906. See 1969 House Hearings, supra 
note 20, at 272. The Forest Service was later granted explicit statutory authority 
to impose grazing fees. 16 U.S.C. § 5801 (1970). However, the bulk of the 
federal range is not under Forest Service jurisdiction. See note 15 supra. This land 
remained uncontrolled until 1935, when the Taylor Grazing Act, 43 U.S.C. § 315 
(1970), became law. The land subject to the Taylor Grazing Act was initially ad-
ministered by the Grazing Service; this agency was later merged into the Bureau of 
Land Management. See P. Foss, supra note 89, at 39-98. 
93. See, e.g., Taylor Grazing Act § 3, 43 U.S.C. § 315b (1970) (BLM); 16 
U.S.C. § 580/ (1970) (Forest Service). 
94. For examples of fee rulings, see 41 Fed. Reg. 13 (1976); 36 C.F.R. § 231.5 
(1976). 
95. See w. CALEF, PRIVATE GRAZING AND PUBLIC LANDS 74-75 (1960); w. 
VOIGT, JR., PUBLIC GRAZING LANDS: USE AND MISUSE BY INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT 
58-59, 85-86 (1975); E. PEFFER, supra note 89, at 260. See generally W. VOIGT, 
JR., supra. 
96. The battle over the level of grazing fees has a long history. A summary of 
BLM efforts to raise fees under the Taylor Grazing Act § 3, 43 U.S.C. § 315b 
(1970), highlights the potential significance of the public land trust in the adminis-
tration of the public lands. For a history of the efforts of the Forest Service to raise 
grazing fees, see W. VOIGT, JR., supra note 95, at 43-131. 
In 1940, the Department of the Interior, realizing that the government received 
less for the use of grazing resources on the public lands than was being received by 
private owners of similar lands, declared that grazing fees were "out of line with po-
tential values." U.S. DEPT.·OF INTERIOR ANN. REP. 336 (1940). See E. PEFFER, 
supra note 89, at 260. The Grazing Service, the predecessor of the BLM, attempted 
to raise grazing fees. However, a combination of interest group pressure, applied by 
Western congressmen representing ranchers and graziers, and the outbreak of World 
War II caused the Department of the Interior to postpone any increase in grazing 
fees. See id. at 260-61. 
In 1944, the Grazing Service, in order to achieve some reimbursement to the gov-
ernment for both the rising quality of range forage and the higher prices being re-
ceived by the ranchers for their livestock, once more proposed an increase in grazing 
fees. Western congressmen, however, who dominated the Senate Committee on Pub-
lic Lands and Surveys, were able to elicit a promise from the Interior Department 
not to raise fees until the committee completed an investigation of the issue. Thus, 
the ranching industry was "again able to use the tactics by which it was to delay 
a fee increase until 1947: attack, postpone, investigate." E. PEFFER, supra note 89, 
at 265. See P. Foss, supra note 89, at 181-83. 
The effectiveness of the ranching lobby in the 1940s cannot be fully appreciated 
simply by recognition of its success in preventing an increase in grazing fees. The 
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broad goal of the Western congressmen was to make public domain administration re-
sponsive to local interests; the means consisted of reducing the Grazing Service to 
a ranching-dependent organization. See E. PEFFER, supra note 89, at 270-71. By 
drawing out its investigation of grazing fees from 1944 to 1947, the Public Lands 
and Survey Committee placed the Grazing Service in the position, of being unable 
to raise grazing fees, and, thus, unable to raise sufficient revenue to cover the cost 
of its operations. This did not escape the attention of the House Committee on Ap-
propriations: 
[T]he Grazing Service [was] caught in a triple play between a Senate committee 
which refused to allow increased fees, a House committee which cut appropria-
tions because fees were not raised, and a powerful interest group which supported 
both committees. The result was inevitable. 
The Grazing Service budget was cut approximately in half • • . . 
On July 16, 1946, the Grazing Service was reorganized into the Bureau of 
Land Management and ceased to exist as a separate organization. 
P. Foss, supra note 89, at 186. See E. PEFFER, supra note 89, at 267-78. 
The BLM has continued to be susceptible to the pressure of the ranching lobby. 
In 1969, for example, the BLM, in conjunction with the Forest Service, promulgated 
regulations that established a ten-year program of yearly fee increases designed to 
reach full market value by 1978. Although the ranching lobby tried and failed to 
prevent promulgation of the program, see 1969 House Hearings, supra note 20; Hear-
ings on Grazing Fees Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands of the Senate Comm. 
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) [hereinafter cited as 
1969 Senate Hearings], lobby pressure has been the cause of at least two of the three 
omitted scheduled increases, see W. VOIGT., JR., supra note 95, at 319, and the pro-
gram's target date has been postponed to 1980. See text at notes 101-02 infra. 
One study of the grazing regulation conducted by the BLM and the Forest Service 
concluded with the following observations: 
My basic conclusion, after a good many years of observation and study, is that 
when the Service did try to impose a firm will upon the industry its successes 
were few and short lived; more often it was outsmarted, adroitly countered, bull-
dozed-or cajoled-into positions and policies more to the livestock industry's 
liking. In time it tired and sought methods of administration that would not 
bring recrimination, or was led by officials who agreed with industry points of 
view. 
Over on the other side of Washington, in Interior's BLM • • • [t]he livestock 
industry rides herd on the agency more than vice versa • . . . 
W. VOIGT., JR., supra note 95, at 315. 
The history of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S. 
C.A. § 1701-82 (Pamphlet No. 4, pt. 3, Dec. 1976), reflects the continuing influence 
of the ranching lobby on Congress. As the bills that eventually became the 1976 
Act were written and passed through the legislative process, the ranching lobby nearly 
gained statutory authority for low grazing fees that, in effect, would have subsidized 
the ranching industry. The original House version of the Act, H.R. 13777, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess., § 210(a) (1976), provided a special pricing formula for grazing fees 
that would ordinarily produce substantially less than market value fees. The Senate 
version, S. 507, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 3(b) (vi) (1975), contained no specific graz-
ing fee provision; instead it provided a general rule of fair market value for all gov-
ernmental leasing and selling ot public land resources. The House vacated passage 
of H.R. 13777 and substituted S. 507, but it amended S. 507 by inserting a subsidized 
fee formula. See H.R. REP. No. 1724, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1976). The House 
and Senate conferees adopted a vague compromise on the grazing fee issue, directing 
the agencies to undertake a study to determine an "equitable" fee level. See 43 U.S. 
C.A. § 1751(a) (Pamphlet No. 4, pt. 3, Dec. 1976); H.R. REP. No. 1724, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1976). As indicated, however, the agencies in charge of admin-
istering the public lands remain susceptible to the interest group pressure that can 
be asserted by the ranching lobby. 
This Note contends that the common-law public land trust provides the Forest 
Service and the BLM with a source of substantive guidance and independent authority 
that will support their position on grazing fees, thereby mitigating the political power 
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subsidizes public land graziers by not charging them for the full 
value of the forage they use. 97 This subsidy encourages livestock 
producers to overuse this artificially cheap resource;08 recent evidence 
confirms that the public range is in a seriously overgrazed and eroded 
condition. 99 
of the ranching lobby and other interest groups. See note 106 infra & text at notes 
109-11 infra. 
97. Grazing fees are calculated in terms of cents per animal-unit-month (AUM). 
An animal unit consists of one cow or horse, or five sheep or goats, except that, for 
the purposes of grazing fees, horses are charged at twice the rate of cows. Thus, 
if the grazing fee were five cents per animal-unit-month, the fee would be five cents 
per month for a cow, ten cents per month for a horse, and one cent per month for 
a sheep or goat. See 43 C.F.R. § 4110.0-5(0) (1976); P. Foss, supra note 89, at 
174; E. PEFFER, supra, note 89, at 260-61. 
In 1976, the fair market value of one AUM of grazing rights, as determined by 
the Bureau of Land Management, was $1.94. ISee Letter from Kay W. Wilkes, Chief 
of the Division of the Range of the Bureau of Land Management, Nov. 25, 1975 (on 
file with Michigan Law Review). The grazing fee set by the BLM for 1976 was 
$1.51 per AUM. 41 Fed. Reg. 13 (1976). Thus, in 1976 public land graziers were 
subsidized $0.43 per AUM. 
A second possible source of revenue loss may be the government's allocation of 
one half of grazing fee revenue to "range improvements." See 41 Fed. Reg. 13 
(1976). "Range improvement" spending is an investment that may produce a long-
run economic benefit for the government by increasing the value of future grazing 
rights. However, this long-term benefit will not necessarily equal the initial invest-
ment in range improvement. If the government does not benefit to the full amount 
of the investment, the economic loss can be characterized as either waste due to 
economically unsound investment policy or as short-term benefit, which, by not bene-
fitting anyone beyond the grazing lessee, is effectively a governmental subsidy of pub-
lic land graziers. There is no indication that the present level of range improvement 
spending is determined in relation to the increased value of future grazing rights. See 
PLLRC, supra note 1, at 286-87. 
It is possible, however, that range improvement spending is designed to produce 
noneconomic benefits, such as watershed protection. If this is true, range improve-
ment expenditures should not be considered as investments in forage production, and, 
consequently, they should not be expected to bring a future monetary return. Also, 
because noneconomic benefits would accrue to the government as owner of the public 
lands, range expenditures should not be considered a subsidy of public land users, 
even though such users might be directly benefited. However, before dismissing the 
idea that range improvement spending is a governmental subsidy of the graziers, it 
should be determined that the external benefit derived from the spending cannot be 
achieved more efficiently by other means-for example, watershed protection through 
a reduction in grazing intensity. 
98. Other things being equal, the pressure to overuse range forage arises when 
a decrease in the cost of production-such as low grazing fees-causes producers to 
supply a greater quantity of livestock at a given price. See generally R. LIPSEY & 
P. STEINER, EcoNOMICS 82-83 (1975). This incentive to increase production is gov-
ernmentally created, and, consequently, its continued existence is subject to political 
fluctuations. Graziers cannot be confident that low grazing fees will continue forever: 
thus, they tend to concentrate their grazing over the short term. See S. CnuACY-
WANTRUP, REsoURCE CoNSERVATION: EcONOMICS AND POLICIES 136 (1963). The 
graziers' behavior has been consistent with this theory; their resistance to the govern• 
ment's campaign to reduce overgrazing 'has been equal to their resistance to grazing 
fee increases. See W. CALEF, supra note 95, at 71-72, 135-40; U.S. FOREST SBRVICll, 
supra note 91, at 4, 8, 14; P. Foss, supra note 89, at 64-65, 140-70. 
99. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829, 
840 (D.D.C. 1974); Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 § 401{b)(l), 
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In 1969, the BLM and the Forest Service began the process of 
terminating this subsidy by establishing a ten-year program of yearly 
fee increases100 designed to reach full market value by 1978.101 
However, the success of this program is by no means assured. The 
agencies have omitted three of eight scheduled increases and have 
postponed the program's target date to 1980.102 A large increase in 
the 1976 fees was ordered, suggesting a determination to reach the 
1980 goal,1°3 but the passage of the FLPMA has added further 
complications. That Act requires the agencies to conduct a new 
grazing fee study104 even though the 1969 fee increase program 
was based on a comprehensive and continuous investigation.105 It is 
impossible to predict the changes that might result from this new 
study. Thus, the level at which grazing fees will be set in the 
immediate future is highly uncertain, and the issue remains suscepti-
ble to continued political infighting.106 
43 U.S.C.A. § 175l(b)(l) (Pamphlet No. 4, pt. 3, Dec. 1976); BUREAU OF LAND 
MANAGEMENT, EFFECTS OF LIVESTOCK GRAZING ON WllDLIFE, WATERSHED, RECRE-
ATION AND OTIIER RESOURCE VALUES IN NEVADA (1974). Overgrazing causes many 
problems: reduction of short-run and long-run carrying capacity, reduction in food 
and habitat for wildlife, erosion of soil nutrients, water siltation, and aesthetic de-
terioration. L. STODDARD, A. SMITH & T. Box, RANGE MANAGEMENT 262-65 (3d ed. 
1975). Siltation can have major economic costs. See W. CALEF, supra note 95, at 
146. 
100. 43 C.F.R. § 4115.2-l(k) (1976); 36 C.F.R. § 231.5 (1976). 
101. See 1969 House Hearings, supra note 20, at 128-30. 
102. See 40 Fed. Reg. 3290 (1975); 37 Fed. Reg. 211, 213 (1972); 35 Fed. Reg. 
2591 (1970). At least the 1970 and 1975 omissions can be attributed to the ranch-
ing lobby. See W. VOIGT, JR., supra note 95, at 319; note 96 supra. 
103. See 41 Fed. Reg. 13 (1976). 
104. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1751{a) (Pamphlet No. 4, pt. 3, Dec. 1976). 
105. See 1969 House Hearings, supra note 20, at 122-24. 
106. The 1976 Act's treatment of the grazing fee issue is apparently a result of 
political infighting, and its likely effect will be to increase such infighting in the 
future. The Act establishes as a general policy that "the United States receive fair 
market value of the use of the public lands and their resources." 43 U.S.C.A. § 1701 
{a) (9) (Pamphlet No. 4, pt. 3, Dec. 1976). However, due to a House-Senate com-
promise over grazing fees, see H.R. REP. No. 1724, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1976), 
the Act also directs the agencies to conduct a study with the aim of establishing graz-
ing fees "equitable to the United States and to the holders of grazing permits and 
leases." 43 U.S.C.A. § 1751(a){Pamphlet No. 4, pt. 3, Dec. 1976). This study, 
an apparent product of ranching lobby pressure on Congress, see note 96 supra, 
appears to be redundant. In the study that led to the promulgation of regulations 
designed to increase fees to fair market value by 1978, see text at note 101 supra, 
the agencies determined that fair market value is an equitable grazing fee. While 
the implementation of fair market value fees has been delayed by lobby pressure, 
see note 96 supra & text at notes 101-02 supra, the agencies have at least been 
able to equate in theory equitable grazing fees with fair market value. Thus, the real 
effect of the 1976 Act will be simply to give the ranching lobby a second chance 
to pressure the BLM and the Forest Service into defining equitable grazing fees as 
something less than fair market value. 
A vitalization of the public land trust would undermine the power of the ranching 
lobby in its continuing conflict with the agencies. If the agencies hold to their pres-
ent position in favor of market value fees, the trust will enable them to support their 
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The grazing fees issue epitomizes several land management prob-
lems that result when resources are priced below market value: the 
government loses potential revenue;107 an inequity is created between 
those citizens who are subsidized and those who are not;108 and 
overexploitation of resources is encouraged.100 Moreover, as this 
controversy demonstrates, land management agencies have been 
vested with broad policy-making responsibilities, but the goals of pub-
lic land management have been so inadequately articulated by Con-
gress that the agencies have been unable to effectuate rational pricing 
policies. Decision-makers have often been forced to rely upon-and 
to accede to-the special interests of well-organized groups;110 this 
situation has diminished the independence and professionalism of 
those who have been charged with protecting the public interest.111 It 
is submitted here that the judicial enforcement of the public land 
trust's fair market value rule offers an appropriate means of amelior-
ating these problems. 
2. Analogous Governmental Trusts 
Courts have on several occasions expressly recognized the duty of 
the government as trustee to secure the fair market value of the assets 
of different kinds of governmental trusts. Those cases interpreting 
two analogous governmental trusts, Indian and school land trusts, 
decision by reference to independent authority, and a citizen could bring suit to force 
market value fees should the agencies find themselves unable to act freely because 
of political pressure. 
While recourse to the trust might thus transfer the political pressure surrounding 
grazing fees to the courts, the judiciary should not be as susceptible to interest group 
pressure as are the agencies. See note 21 supra. Moreover, as this Note attempts 
to demonstrate, the trust and its market value rule are supported by both common 
law and statutory authority; thus courts would not be institutionally free to redefine 
the duties of the public land trust in conformance with interest pressure demands, 
Consequently, the trust would effect a real reduction in interest group power. 
107. See note 97 supra. 
108. When, in order to create a subsidy, the price of a commodity is artificially 
held below market price, demand for the commodity will exceed the supply and some 
mechanism other than price must be used to ration the available supply. To be equi-
table, the rationing mechanism must serve to carry out the policy that underlies the 
subsidy; otherwise, some of the subsidized resource is wasted on nontarget individuals. 
In the case of grazing fees, one justification for the present subsidy is welfare for 
the poor. See, e.g., 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 96, at 31-32. However, public 
land grazing priority is awarded on the basis of seniority, not poverty, See 43 C.F.R. 
§§ 4111.3-1; 4110.0-5(m) (1976); text at notes 212-18 infra. If the government 
should devise a rationing mechanism to effectuate an articulated objective of the 
grazing subsidy, administration of such a carefully tailored rationing mechanism may 
be expensive. See M. CLAWSON & B. HELD, supra note 6, at 203. 
109. See note 98 supra. 
110. See note 96 supra. 
111. See generally U.S. FoRESr SERVICE, supra note 98, at 2; T. Lowr, supra note 
50, at 153-56. 
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have squarely upheld the government's duty to secure full value.112 
For example, in Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States,113 the 
Court of Claims held that the government's fiduciary duty to the 
Navajos required it to compensate them for the full value of certain 
helium rights that the government had leased from the Tribe. Like-
wise, in United States v. 111.2 Acres of Land, 114 the United States 
district court required the government to compensate fully a school 
land trust. It is perhaps because of the relative obscurity of the public 
land trust115 that no decisions interpreting this trust have directly 
addressed the issue of return on assets.116 However, the public land 
trust is sufficiently similar to the Indian and school land trusts to 
warrant application of the fair market value rule. 
The most important similarity is that proprietary objectives such 
as revenue generation and resource exploitation figure prominently in 
the administration of the lands subject to all three trusts.117 It is true 
that proprietary objectives are not the exclusive goals of the land 
subject to the Indian and public land trusts.118 For example, modern 
public land management emphasizes multiple uses, some of which are 
112. !See Lassen v. Arizona ex rel. Arizona Highway Dept., 385 U.S. 458, 466, 
469 (1967) (school land trust); Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 364 F.2d 
320, 338 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (Indian trust); Bailey v. Bannister, 200 F.2d 683, 685 (10th 
Cir. 1952) (Indian trust); United States v. 111.2 Acres of Land, 293 F. Supp. 1042, 
1045-46 (E.D. Wash. 1968) (school land trust); Manchester Band of Pomo Indians 
v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238, 1245-47 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (Indian trust). 
Lassen demonstrates the recent trend of vigorous enforcement of governmental trusts. 
In that case the Court ignored an earlier decision, Alabama v. Schmidt, 232 U.S. 168 
(1914), which held that school trusts are not judicially enforceable. 
Money damages was the remedy sought in these cases establishing the market 
value rule. If the market value rule is extended to the public land trust, however, 
money damages would not be an appropriate remedy because requiring the federal 
government to give money back to itself would serve no useful purpose. Instead, the 
proper remedy would be a court order or injunction; such relief has been granted in 
violations of other governmental trusts. See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians 
v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 265 (D.D.C. 1972); Sierra Club v. Department of the 
Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284, 294 (N.D. Cal. 1975). 
113. 364 F.2d 320, 338 (Ct. Cl. 1966). 
114. 293 F. Supp. 1042, 1045-56 (E.D. Wash. 1968). 
115. This writer has found only one commentary on the cases that establish the 
trust-Montgomery, supra note 19. 
116. See cases cited note 24 supra. 
117. See Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 § 102(a) (9), (12), 
43 U.S.C.A. § 1701(a)(9)(12) (Pamphlet No. 4, pt. 3, Dec. 1976) (public land 
trust land); PLLRC, supra note 1, at 37 (public land trust land); Navajo Tribe of 
Indians v. United States, 364 F.2d 320, 322 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (Indian trust land); Man-
chester Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238, 1243-45 (N.D. 
Cal. 1973) (Indian trust land); United States v. 111.2 Acres of Land, 293 F. Supp. 
1042, 1044-45 (E.D. Wash. 1968) (school land trust land). 
118. See Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 § 102(a)(8), 43 
U.S.C.A. § 1701(a)(8) (Pamphlet No. 4, pt. 3, Dec. 1976) (public land trust land); 
PLLRC, supra note 1, at 36-37 (public land trust land); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe 
of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 254-56 (D.D.C. 1972) (Indian trust land). 
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proprietary and some of which are sovereign. 110 Yet the existence of 
nonproprietary objectives does not render the fair market value rule 
inappropriate; when both sovereign and proprietary uses are made of 
the same land, public land trust theory determines how the propri-
etary use should be managed, and other theories regulate the sovereign 
uses. 120 With respect to the specific proprietary objectives that the 
school, Indian, and public land trusts have in common, the three 
trusts are functionally identical, and the fair market value is appropri-
ate for each. 
Nevertheless, several differences arguably distinguish the public 
land trust from other governmental trusts. First, the trusts might be 
distinguished by the size and political strength of their beneficiary 
classes. The beneficiaries of the public land trust comprise the 
greater part of the national population, whereas the beneficiaries 
of the Indian and perhaps school trusts are smaller, more distinct 
groups.121 Since the beneficiaries of the public land trust comprise 
a clear majority of the voting public, they should theoretically be able 
to protect their interests by political means, thereby obviating the 
need for judicial protection. However, the reality of interest group 
119. See PILRC, supra note 1, at 36-37. 
120. Under the public land trust, the courts will have to make the final determin-
ation of whether the governmental objective in a particular allocation of public land 
use is proprietary or sovereign. If the courts automatically accept agency deter-
minations, the agencies will easily be able to circumvent burdensome restrictions 
of the trust by declaring that a particular land use allocation has a sovereign objec-
tive. Congressional declarations of the governmental objective behind a particular 
allocation of public land use also should not be immune to judicial review; they 
should be subjected to the same strict scrutiny as other congressionally directed limits 
on the trust. See text at notes 49-55 supra. 
Undoubtedly, there are nonproprietary benefits in every use of the public lands, 
but these are often merely incidental to the primary objective of the government 
in allowing a particular use of the public lands. The chief task of the courts is to 
determine whether the primary benefits sought by the government through the- land 
use are proprietary or nonproprietary. They should consider such factors as agency 
and legislative characterization of the land use, the nature of the private parties 
allowed to use the land, the existence of competing private markets for the land use, 
and the validity of claimed nonproprietary objectives in light of the particular use 
in question. The presence of commercial users, the existence of a competing private 
market, and the absence of legitimate nonproprietary goals indicate that the govern-
mental objective is proprietary, regardless of agency or congressional characteriza-
tion. In the case of the sale of grazing rights, the factors indicate a proprietary goal, 
for the purchasers are businesses, there is a competing private market, and, as this 
Note concludes, there are no legitimate nonproprietary objectives to be sought 
through grazing fees. See text at notes 209-3·3 infra. For a discussion of the govern-
mental objective behind the use of land for recreation and conservation, see notes 
231, 232 infra. 
121. If the beneficiaries of the school land trust are viewed as school children 
who get educational opportunities they would not otherwise have, the beneficiaries 
are a small and politically weak group. However, if proceeds from the school land 
trust simply replace tax funds, thereby leaving the state's total expenditures on school-
ing unchanged, all taxpayers are the beneficiaries. Under the latter alternative, the 
beneficiary class is indistinguishable from that of the public land trust. 
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politics casts serious doubt on this assumption. A sizable body of 
documentation demonstrates that diffuse majorities are very vulner-
able to pressures exerted by organized minorities.122 The grazing 
fee controversy exemplifies this phenomenon in the public land con-
text.123 Notwithstanding considerable evidence that general public 
sentiment has long opposed the graziers' subsidy,124 the superior 
organization of the ranchers has enabled them to maintain fees at a 
low level for many years.125 
The effectiveness of the organized grazing lobby can be under-
stood by examining some of its tactics.126 One of the lobby's most 
successful approaches has been to work very closely with the congres-
sional public lands subcommittees. In the last Congress, seventeen of 
the twenty-six members of these subcommittees came from public 
land states.127 Congressmen from these states tend to take a paro-
chial view of public land priorities; they usually favor commercial 
users of local importance and attach little significance to issues of 
national proportions, such as the revenue potential of the fee, the 
interests of recreational users, and environmental considerations.128 
Throughout the history of the grazing fee issue, the public land 
subcommittees have used official and unofficial procedures repeatedly 
to forestall fee increases.129 
122. See, e.g., Lowi, How the Farmers Get What They Want, THE REPORTER, 
May 21, 1964, at 34, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE PoLmcs, USA 132 (T. Lowi ed. 
1965); Morgan, Pressure Politics and Resource Administration, 18 J. POL. 39 (1956), 
reprinted in PRESSURE GROUPS IN AMERICAN PoLmcs 244 (H. Mahood ed. 1967). 
-See generally M. CLAWSON & B. HELD, supra note 6, at 136-41; L. ZIEGLER & G. 
PEAK, INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 215-95 (1972). 
123. See note 96 supra. 
124. See, e.g., DeVeto, The West Against Itself, HARPER'S, Jan. 1947, at 1, 3-4, 
10-13; DeVeto, Your National Forests, HOLIDAY, Aug. 1956, at 86, 103-04; Public 
Property, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 30, 1961, at 6. 
125. See W. CALEF, supra note 95, at 72-76; note 96 supra. 
126. The tactics discussed below are not a unique development of the ranchers' 
lobby, but rather they are typical of the techniques of all interest group lobbies. See 
D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS; 352-95 (1951); L. ZIEGLER & G. PEAK, 
supra note 122, at 133-60; Henning, The Public Land Law Review Commission: .A. 
Political and Western Analysis, 7 IDAHO L. REV. 77, 78 (1970). 
127. See SUBCOMMS. AND SELECT AND SPECIAL CoMMS. OF THE SENATE OF THB 
UNITED STATES, 94th Cong. 11 (1975); UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
LEGISLATIVE CALENDAR, 94th Cong., CoMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AF-
FAIRS 3 (1975). 
"Public land states" typically are defined as the 11 westernmost continental states-
Washington, Oregon, California, Nevada, Arizona, Utah, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, 
Colorado, and New Mexico-plus Alaska. These states contain the bulk of the fed-
eral public lands. See PLLRC, supra note 1, at 22. 
Congressmen from public land states understandably strive to be on these sub-
committees because the decisions of the subcommittees are important to the members' 
constituencies. See M. CLAWSON & B. HELD, supra note 6, at 145-46. As a corol-
lary, congressmen from nonpublic land states tend to avoid these low visibility sub-
committees in which their constituents have little interest. 
128. See Henning, supra note 126, at 78. 
129. See note 96 supra. Subcommittees play a major role in the congressional 
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The superior organization of user groups also enables them to 
dominate public hearings.130 When the House of Representatives 
held hearings on the 1968 regulations that increased grazing fees, the 
pro-grazier position was presented by numerous livestock organiza-
tions, 131 banks, chambers of commerce, 132 and western state and local 
governments.133 Only the Bureau of the Budget134 and certain con-
servation groups urged that fees be set at fair market value, 136 and the 
conservationists supported market value fees not because that ap-
proach would eliminate the grazier subsidy but because it would 
reduce overuse of the public range.136 The Bureau of the Budget 
was the only representative for the taxpayers who have subsidized 
grazing permittees for several generations. 
This scenario helps explain why the political process has 
produced fragmented and incomplete public land policy and has 
failed to protect the majority's interest. Yet it is not self-evident that 
judicial intervention through the public land trust is the appropriate 
means to protect this interest. Courts are often envisioned as the 
chief guarantor of minority rights against the zealousness of majority 
rule. 137 It is arguable that the judiciary is not the appropriate branch 
to protect majoritarian interests, but this argument is implicitly re-
futed by the increasing use of the public trust, which, like the public 
land trust, protects the majority's interest.138 Other jurisprudential 
process. In particular, a subcommittee largely controls whether new legislation 
reaches the floor for a vote. This power can be used to strengthen a subcommittee's 
bargaining position with the executive agencies; the grazing fee history suggests that 
this bargaining power is often sufficient to enable a subcommittee to achieve its ob-
jective without passing legislation. See E. PEFFER, supra note 89, at 261, quoting 
S. REP. No. 404, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 83 (1943): 
Senator McCarran sprang into action to forestall the adoption of the new fee 
[proposed by the Grazing Service] and the graduated basis of assessment. He 
promised meetings to combat the increase; and here his investigating committee 
was to prove of immediate advantage. He also introduced a bill to amend the 
Taylor Grazing Act: "The Secretary [of the Interior] shall not make any 
change in the fees payable for grazing livestock within any district unless the 
advisory board for such district has consented to such change." 
The fees were not increased at this time. 
130. The importance of hearing testimony is disputed. See D. TRUMAN, supra 
note 126, at 372-77; L. ZIEGLER & G. PEAK, supra note 122, at 140. However, some 
public land hearings appear to have been particularly effective in changing agency 
policy. See W. VOIGT, JR., supra note 95, at 279-80. 
131. See 1969 House Hearings, supra note 20, at 233, 289, 341, 354, 360, 379. 
132. See id. at 55, 62-63, 492. 
133. See id. at 46-48, 452. 
134. See id. at 65. 
135. See id. at 307, 312,470,483. 
136. See id. at 312. 
137. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton). 
138. See Sax, supra note 43, at 556. The school land trusts also may protect a 
majoritarian interest. See note 121 supra. 
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considerations, discussed below, also justify judicial supervision in 
this context.139 
The experience with this trust and with other governmental trusts 
as well demonstrates not only that this mechanism is within the sphere 
of legitimate judicial activity but also that the trust concept is a 
particularly effective means by which courts can attack the interest 
group problem.140 Regardless of the size of the beneficiary class, 
governmental trusts force agencies to develop rational bases for their 
policies, and the substantive contents of the trusts provide agencies 
with guidance for developing principles that can serve as the bases for 
future decisions. This theory was developed by Professor Lowi, who 
contends that, in the absence of general rules, agencies resolve con-
flicts by situation-oriented compromises that have no precedential 
value.141 However, if the agencies are forced to resolve conflicts by 
referring to a general rule, they will develop a principled body of 
law.142 The public land trust's market value requirement is precisely 
the kind of rule that would encourage this kind of evolutionary 
development. Even if land management agencies conclude that cer-
tain exceptions to the rule are beneficial, the trust should insure that 
these exceptions are part of a rational scheme rather than mere 
responses to organized interests. 143 In short, interest group analysis 
suggests that the size of the beneficiary class does not render the 
public land trust ineffective and does not constitute a valid reason to 
distinguish it from the school land and Indian trusts. 
One might assert a second distinction, unique to state school land 
trusts, that is based on supposed differences between state and federal 
ownership.144 However, in United States v. Groen,145 the court relied 
upon state and federal public trust cases interchangeably and gave no 
indication that the distinction has any significance.146 Indeed, be-
cause the public land trust is in essence a means of apportioning the 
power to effectuate land management policy among different 
139. See text at notes 140-43 infra. 
140. See Sax, supra note 43, at 556-57. 
141. See T. Low1, supra note 50, at 146-56. An agency's bargaining method of 
decision-making can be viewed as providing interest groups the opportunity to negoti-
ate a compromise that benefits society as a whole. However, this can occur only 
when all societal interests are represented during the bargaining process, which is not 
always the case. See Wengert, Citizen Participation: Practice in Search of a The-
ory, 16 NAT. RES. J. 23, 36 (1976). 
142. In Professor Lowi's words, "law begets law." T. LoWI, supra note 50, at 
154 (emphasis original). 
143. The history of the grazing fee controversy suggests that without legal guid-
ance political power is the predominant factor in agency decision-making. See note 
96 supra. 
144. The states serve as trustees of the school land trusts, while the federal gov-
ernment is trustee of the public land trust. 
145. 72 F. Supp. 713 (D.D.C. 1947). 
146. 72 F. Supp. at 719, 
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branches of government, 147 it is difficult to perceive why federalism 
considerations should have any relevance at all. 
Finally, it is possible to distinguish Indian trusts from the public 
land trust by arguing that Indian trusts deserve special judicial protec-
tion. Chief Justice Marshall long ago established the doctrine that 
the Indian's "relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to 
his guardian. "148 However, cases interpreting Indian trusts have not 
relied heavily upon policy considerations, but have instead focused 
upon treaty language, and it is not clear to what extent a special legal 
relationship exists in the absence of a treaty. 149 Even if future courts 
give the Indian trust cases a more charitable reading, the special 
status of these trusts may still not distinguish them from the pub-
lic land trust. Environmental interests "have always had a special 
claim to judicial protection";150 hence, the public land trust, a source 
of environmental remedies, 151 should also have special judicial 
status.152 Courts have recognized this similarity; two recent cases 
affirming the existence of the public land trust-David v. Morton1G3 
and Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior,164 both of which were 
noted earlier155-use public land trust and Indian trust precedents 
interchangeably.11rn Thus, whatever differences do exist between the 
two kinds of trusts appear to be of little significance. 
All of the supposed distinctions discussed above-the size and 
power of the beneficiary class, the difference between state and 
federal ownership, and the possibility that other trusts have a pre-
ferred status-fail to overcome the fundamental similarity of the 
public land, school, and Indian trusts.157 Therefore, the fair market 
147. See note 54 supra. 
148. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831); accord, Semin-
ole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1941 ). 
149. See Ash Sheep Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 159, 164 (1920); Gila River 
Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States, 427 F.2d 1194-200 (Ct. Cl.), 
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970). 
150. -uee Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 
(D.C. Cir. 1971); accord, Maryland-Natl. Capital Park & Planning Commn. v. 
United States Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029, 1039 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
151. See text at notes 200-06 infra. 
152. See Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389,409 (1917). 
153. 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972). 
154. 376 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974). 
155. See text at notes 32-36 supra. 
156. 469 F.2d at 597, citing Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 
389, 409 (1917); 376 F. Supp. at 95, citing Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567 (9th 
Cir. 1971). 
157. If these trusts were to conflict witli one another, there may be enough differ-
ences among them to enable a court to determine priorities. For example, in cases 
where Indian fishing rights protected by Indian trusts conflicted with public fishing 
rights protected by the public trust, priority has turned on Indian treaty language. 
In Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 87 (1918), despite the govern-
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value rule, currently in use for the school and Indian trusts, can 
validly be extended to the public land trust. 
3. Analogous Statutory Policies 
In addition to the support for the fair market value rule that exists 
in the case law, three statutes-the FLPMA, 158 the Independent 
Offices Appropriation Act (IOAA),159 and the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) 160-also recommend the market 
value rule. Although these statutes have no direct connection with 
the public land trust, they indicate that the policy objectives Con-
gress has identified are identical to those that the judiciary has sought 
to effectuate through the various governmental trusts.161 
Section 102(a)(9) of the FLPMA provides that "it is the policy 
of the United States that . . . the United States receive fair market 
value of the use of the public lands and their resources unless other-
wise provided for by statute."162 Although this preambulatory provi-
sion is not self-executing, and its policies would only become effective 
"as specific statutory authority for their implementation is en-
acted,"163 section 102(a)(3) does provide the courts with valuable 
support for the trust's substantive content. The reluctance of Con-
gress to effectuate immediately the fair market value policy does not 
significantly weaken the force of this policy; rather, it is only further 
ment's citation of public trust decisions, the Supreme Court held that the federal gov-
ernment had the power to give public trust property (navigable waters and submerged 
lands) exclusively to an Indian tribe. See Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United 
States, 391 U.S. 404, 406-07 (1968). See also Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337 
U.S. 86, 122-23 (1949). However, where the claim to exclusive Indian fishing rights 
was based upon aboriginal title rather than treaty, the Indians had no priority over 
the general public. Tlingit & Haida Indians v. United States, 389 F.2d 778, 785-
87 (Ct. Cl. 1968). 
158. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-82 (Pamphlet No. 4, pt. 3, Dec. 1976). 
159. 31 U.S.C. § 483a (1970). Technically, this Act should have no name be-
cause it was only a rider to the Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1952, ch. 
376, 65 Stat. 268, 290 (1951). However, for the sake of convenience and consist-
ency with the practice of the Supreme Court, see National Cable Television Assn. 
v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 337 (1973), this Note will use the full name of the 
Act. The Act was largely ignored until the Bureau of the Budget used it as authority 
for Circular A-25, Sept. 23, 1959, which outlined general fee policy for all agencies. 
See 1969 House Hearings, supra note 20, at 80-87. 
160. 42 u.s.c. §§ 4321-4347 (1970). 
161. Because the trust and the statutes are in harmony, the narrow construction 
rule, see text at note 49 supra, does not apply. 
162. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1701(a)(9) (Pamphlet No. 4, pt. 3, Dec. 1976). 
163. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1701(b) (Pamphlet No. 4, pt. 3, Dec. 1976). The Act makes 
no attempt to resolve the grazing fees issue; it states only that fees should be "equit-
able." See 43 U.S.C.A. § 175l(a) (Pamphlet No. 4, Part 3, Dec., 1976). The 
"equitable" standard was a compromise between the House and Senate versions of 
the Act. See note 96 supra. The Conference Report is unilluminating as to the 
meaning of the compromise provision. See H.R. REP. No. 1724, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 
63 (1976). 
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evidence of Congress' characteristic unwillingness to respond to the 
problems of public land management. Thus, it is appropriate to use 
the trust doctrine to make operative the policies of section 102 
(a)(3).rn4 
The second statutory provision, the IOAA, prescribes several 
factors that all agencies must consider in setting fees: 
It is the sense of Congress that any . . . benefit, privilege . . . 
or similar thing of value or utility . . . granted . . . by any federal 
agency . . . shall be self sustaining to the full extent possible, and 
the head of each federal agency is authorized to prescribe therefor 
such fee, charge, or price, as he shall determine . . . to be fair 
and equitable taking into consideration direct and indirect cost to 
the government, value to the recipient, public policy or interest 
served, and other pertinent facts . . . .165 
This language is, by itself, unilluminating.166 One uncertainty is 
whether the "self-sustaining" factor, in addition to requiring an 
agency to raise fees that fail to cover the cost of its operation, also 
requires an agency to reduce fees that generate revenues in excess of 
its operating costs even though the fees are set at the fair market value 
of the resource sold or leased. Such an interpretation would compel 
the BLM, which generates more revenue than it expends, 107 to reduce 
grazing fees. Although the literal language of the statute does not 
preclude this interpretation and several recent decisions from the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit appear to 
support it, 168 legislative history suggests that Congress did not intend 
the act to be read in this manner.169 Moreover, the BLM apparently 
164. See notes 96, 106 supra. 
165. 31 U.S.C. § 483a (1970). 
166. Despite the opening language suggesting that section 483a is merely an ad• 
visory resolution, this act was signed by the President, recorded in the Statutes at 
Large, Act of Aug. 31, 1951, ch. 376, § 501, 65 Stat. 290, and codified in the United 
States Code. When the Supreme Court interpreted this provision, it referred to it 
as an "Act," and treated it as an ordinary statute. See National Cable Television 
Assn. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974); note 159 supra. 
167. See U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, PuBuc LAND STATISTICS 164 (1974). 
Forest Service revenues are less than expenditures. See U.S. FOREST SERVICE, supra 
note 4, at 9. 
168. See, e.g., National Assn. of Broadcasters v. FCC, No. 75-1087 (D.C. Cir. 
Dec. 16, 1976); Capital Cities Communications, Inc. v. FCC, No. 75-1503 (D.C. 
Cir. Dec. 16, 1976). For a discussion of these cases, see notes 180, 183 infra. 
169. S. REP. No. 2120, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1950), was not tied directly to 
section 483a (the IOAA), but it was a stimulus that lead to its enactment. See FPC 
v. New Eng. Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 354-55 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
This report specifically named Forest Service grazing fees as one of several agency 
fees that Congress sought to have increased, even though at that time it was apparent 
that the Forest Service would soon be self-supporting. Also, when the IOAA was 
enacted in 1951, the Forest Service was self-sustaining. See U.S. FOREST SERV1CE, 
REPORT OF THE CHIEF 37 (1951). Thus, it appears the Congress intended the "self-
sustaining" language to induce agencies to raise fees, if fair and equitable, regardless 
of operating costs. 
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did not even consider the possibility that the "self-sustaining" require-
ment might serve as an upper limit on fees when it increased grazing 
fees170 pursuant to the act's grant of authority;171 nor was this issue 
raised in Pankey Land and Cattle Co. v. Hardin, 172 where the increase 
was challenged. Using this language to reduce fees would produce a 
windfall for those users fortunate enough to deal with wealthy agen-
cies ;173 such a distinction among users might violate the equal protec-
tion requirements of the due process clause.174 
In addition to the difficulty with the "self-sustaining" language, 
the meaning of the factors in the IOAA that are to be used for setting 
fees cannot be discerned from the language of the statute alone.175 
The Supreme Court has examined this act in two recent cases: 
National Cable Television Association v. United States176 and Federal 
Power Commission v. New England Power Co.177 The cases con-
cerned regulatory fees set by the Federal Communications Commis-
sion and the Federal Power Commission, both of which had estab-
lished fees at levels sufficient to cover the "direct and indirect costs" 
of regulatory administration. 178 The Court held in both cas~s that 
the agencies could charge the regulatees only for the value that they 
received, and not for the cost of the agencies' administration: 
"'[V]alue to the recipient' is we believe, the measure of the .author-
ized fee."179 "Value to the recipient" is the same standard as the fair 
170. 43 C.F.R. § 4115.2-l(k) (1976); 36 C.F.R. § 231.5 (1976). 
111. See 1969 Hearings, supra note 20, at 161-64. 
172. 427 F.2d 43 (10th Cir. 1970). 
173. Grazing fees provide a good example. Forest Service and BLM fees cover 
the identical product-the right to graze on federal lands. However, the BLM, due 
to its jurisdiction over offshore oil leases, generates a large revenue surplus, see U.S. 
DEPT. OF TIIE INTERIOR, supra note 167, at 164, while the Forest Service does not 
quite break even, see U.S. FoREST SERVICE, supra note 167, at 9. Thus, if the "self-
sustaining" language were to impose an upper limit on BLM grazing fees because of 
total BLM revenue, the right to graze on federal lands could have two prices for rea-
sons wholly unrelated to the grazing market. 
114. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 770 (1975); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 
417 U.S. 628, 637 (1974); United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 
528, 533 & n.5 (1973). The issue would be whether distinguishing fee levels on the 
basis of the gross receipts of various agencies is rational. See, e.g., 413 U.S. at 533. 
For example, if the purpose of grazing fees is revenue from the sale of a marketable 
product, then setting fees for reasons unrelated to the grazing market would appear 
to be irrational. See note 173 supra. 
115. See FPC v. New Eng. Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 356 (1974) (Marshall, J., 
concurring). 
176. 415 U.S. 336 (1974). 
177. 415 U.S. 345 (1974). 
178. 415 U.S. at 340(National Cable); 415 U.S. at 346-47 (New Eng. Power). 
179. 415 U.S. at 342-4-3 (National Cable). "Cost of administration" was an im-
proper standard because some of this cost inured to the benefit of the public. Charg-
ing the regulatees for the public benefit would constitute a tax that agencies are not 
authorized to impose. 415 U.S. at 343 (National Cable). 
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market value rule in the public land trust.180 Hence, the Court's 
180. "Value" is an imprecise term. It is first necessary to decide whether "value 
to the recipient" under the IOAA is to be determined on a subjective or objective 
basis. It is evident that the Court in National Cable and New Eng. Power sought 
to avoid the difficult problems inherent in a subjective test-the value of the con-
sideration to a particular individual-and intended an objective measure-the value 
of the governmental consideration itself. See 415 U.S. at 349 (New Eng. Power), 
quoting Bureau of the Budget, Budget Circular No. A-25, Sept. 23, 1959 ("[A] rea-
sonable charge 'should be made to each identifiable recipient for a measurable unit 
or amount of Government service or property from which he derives a special bene-
fit'") (emphases omitted and added). 
Nevertheless, even the objective measure of "value to the recipient" cannot be de-
termined in a vacuum. In private markets, for example, the value received by the 
purchasing party to a sale depends on the amount of the service or commodity pur-
chased that will be supplied by producers at various prices. When the supply is 
known, the recipients manifest their valuation of the service or commodity by the 
amount they are willing to pay to clear the market-which is, by definition, the fair 
market value. Thus, when there is a competing private market for a service or com-
modity provided by the government, the private market value of the service or com-
modity acts as a self-defining measure of "value to the recipient" for the purpose of 
setting fees under section 483a (the IOAA). This is the situation that exists for the 
sale or lease of most government owned natural resources, including grazing lands. 
See PLLRC, supra note 1, at 105; note 211 infra. 
However, when the government provides a service or commodity for which there 
is no competing private market, there is no self-defining measure of "value to the 
recipient." Theoretically, "value to the recipient" in this situation should be deter-
mined by the creation of a market value through a process of open bidding. Where 
this is not practical, the only convenient measure of "value to the recipient" for 
setting fees under the IOAA is the cost to the government of the service or property 
provided each recipient. Thus, because there is no private market for the regulatory 
services provided by the FCC and the FPC, see note 186 infra, the Supreme Court 
in National Cable and New England Power spoke of "value to the recipient" in terms 
of the portion of administrative costs that could be legitimately attributed to the ser-
vice provided each recipient. See 451 U.S. at 343 (National Cable); 451 U.S. at 
349 (New Eng. Power). 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, however, apparently has 
found in the Supreme Court decisions a broad rule to the effect that agency fees can, 
in no case, exceed some portion of administrative cost. In National Assn. of Broad-
caster v. FCC, No. 75-1087 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 16, 1976), the court declared in a foot-
note that National Cable had established an "overall requirement that the [fee] pro-
ceeds be fairly related to costs and that a proper nexus exist between the service, the 
cost of the service and the fee charged for the service." Slip op. at 43 n.28; see 
Capital Cities Communications, Inc. v. FCC, No. 75-1503, slip op. at 7 (D.C. Cir. 
Dec. 16, 1976). The "overall requirement" seemingly would limit fees for the benefit 
of governmental activity to some portion of administrative cost. 
However, there are two reasons for doubting that the Court actually intended a 
blanket prohibition of the use of market value in setting fees for services or commod-
ities. First, limiting fees to the cost of service in the context of a lease or sale of 
government-owned resources produces blatantly unreasonable results. For example, 
under such a rule the government would be able to charge the lessee of an oil well 
only for the government's out-of-pocket costs in servicing the lease, which would be 
only a small fraction of the lease value of a privately owned oil well. Concern for 
the unreasonable results that would occur if the Court's rule were applied in all 
contexts apparently was the cause of Judge Tamm's concurring opinion. He dis-
agreed with the Court's dictum that in all cases "value to the recipient" must be 
determined in connection with cost: 
I do not believe that we should now attempt to limit further the applicable statu-
tory standard by peremptorily defining "value to the recipient" as including only 
the costs and not also the value of the benefits bestowed on a regulatee . . . . . 
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interpretation of the IOAA supports by implication the notion of 
imposing a duty on agencies pursuant to the public land trust to 
obtain fair market value for the sale or lease of resources. 
It is noteworthy that National Cable and New England Power 
concerned agency price-setting for government-supplied services that 
had no alternative use. The Court in this context interpreted the 
statutory language, "direct and indirect cost," to mean the cost of 
government administration181 and then rejected this pricing factor by 
concluding that "value to the recipient" is the appropriate measure-
ment. When user fees are set for resources for which there is an 
alternative use, the other pricing factors mentioned in the IOAA may 
be relevant.182 When agencies set a fee in this situation, -the govern-
ment suffers an additional indirect cost that economists refer to as 
"opportunity cost."183 Opportunity cost is "the value of the best 
alternative course of action that could have been chosen instead [of 
that actually chosen]."184 For example, when the government issues 
I am not convinced that [National Cable] prohibits [agencies] from devel-
oping a free [sic] schedule through a measure of "value to the recipient" that is 
not initially related to its costs. 
No. 75-1087, slip op. at 1-2 (Tamm, J., concurring). This interpretation of National 
Cable would permit an agency to use market value, when fair and equitable, as a 
measure of "value to the recipient" under the IOAA. 
Second, the court explicitly emphasized that the Supreme Court in National Cable 
"did not read out the ability of agencies to recoup the attributable 'direct and indirect 
costs authorized by [the IOAA]." No. 75-1087, slip op. at 43 n.28 (emphasis 
original). While the court in National Broadcasters did not define what might con-
stitute "indirect costs," total administrative costs are not indirect costs, see text at 
notes 178-81 supra, and it is possible that "indirect costs" include "opportunity costs." 
Use of the opportunity cost concept in determining agency fees for the use of natural 
resources would lead to fees equal to the fair market value of the resource. See 
text at notes 181-84 infra. 
181. 415 U.S. at 340-43; see note 179' supra. 
182. The Court in National Cable expressly left open the validity of using the 
other factors listed in section 483a (the IOAA) to set agency fees for benefits other 
than cable television regulation: "The words 'public policy or interest served, and 
other pertinent facts' would not seem relevant to the present case, whatever may be 
their ultimate reach." 415 U.S. at 343, quoting 31 U.S.C. § 483a (1970) (emphasis 
added). 
183. Actually, in conceptual terms, all costs are opportunity costs. See R. LIP-
SEY & P. STEINER, supra note 98, at 194-96. However, the opportunity cost concept 
is particularly useful in understanding the proper valuation of fees for the use of gov-
ernment-owned resources because there is little out-of-pocket cost due to services in 
this situation. Thus, the text refers to opportunity cost as an "additional" cost. 
In Capital Cities .Communications, Inc. v. FCC, No. 75-1503 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 16, 
1976), and National Assn. of Broadcasters v. FCC, No. 1087 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 
16, 1976), there was an opportunity cost arguably analogous to the one present 
in the context of public land resources. These cases dealt with the level of fees that 
the FCC charged for the right to use broadcast channels, a scarce commodity con-
trolled exclusively by the government. The court stated that agency fees must be 
related to agency costs, see note 180 supra, but limited its discussion to the "cost of 
services" without considering the opportunity costs of not awarding channels to the 
highest bidder. However, there is no suggestion in the case that the FCC sought 
to capture opportunity costs; therefore the issue remains open even in the District 
of Columbia Circuit. 
184. E. MANSFIELD, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 163 (1974), 
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a grazing permit to one rancher, the opportunity cost is the amount 
that other ranchers would have been willing to pay for the permit-
that is, the market value. Thus, both the "value to the recipient" and 
"cost" factors of the IOAA indicate that the proper measure of the fee 
is the market value of the resource. 
A complication arises when an agency directs that land be used for 
a specified activity, the value of which is less than its opportunity cost. 
For example, if, because of environmental concerns, land that con-
tains a valuable coal deposit is used for a low-return activity such as 
grazing, the opportunity cost of grazing (coal production) is greater 
than the value of the grazing. The issue here is what scope of 
opportunities should be relevant in determining opportunity cost-
only the activity designated by the agency or any activity not prohib-
ited by statute.185 National Cable and New England Power do not 
resolve the question of whether opportunity cost should be considered 
by agencies when setting user fees. The Court's "value to the recipi-
ent" factor is not determinative because it does not specify which 
recipient-the particular user chosen by the agency or the most 
remunerative user irrespective of whether he is the actual recipient-
should be used to measure value and hence the size of the fee. 180 
The opportunity cost issue is significant because much of the 
public land is not used in the most profitable manner. 187 The gov-
ernment often forgoes maximum revenues because it recognizes 
that some kinds of land use benefit the public in a way that is not 
reflected in the pricing mechanism.188 For example, recreational use 
often does not contribute as much revenue to the government as does 
185. Some land uses, such as industrial use, are prohibited on all the public lands 
in the sense that they are not included among the authorizations of the enabling stat-
ute. See Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 § 1, 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1970). 
Certain land uses are prohibited only in specified areas, such as the ban on mining 
in wilderness areas that will take effect after 1983. See Wilderness Act of 1964 § 
4(b), (c), (d)(3), 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b), (d)(3) (1970). Obviously, in these situa-
tions the value of the prohibited use should not be considered. 
186. The opportunity cost issue did not exist in National Cable and New England 
Power because those cases involved fees for governmental services for which there 
are no alternative uses, rather than fees for the use of governmental resources for 
which alternative users can readily be found in a private market. The "cost of ser-
vices" in National Cable and New England Power was apparently the cost of the 
regulatory personnel's labor and, presumably, the FCC and FPC are not authorized 
to use their employees in profit making enterprises. Thus, there was no possibility 
that there could be alternative recipients of the fruits of the agencies' labor forces. 
187. See M. CLAWSON & B. HELD, supra note 6, at 132. 
188. See id. at 202; PLLRC, supra note 1, at 47. If the government allocated 
uses solely on the basis of private market considerations, there would be no justifica-
tion for government ownership and the public lands should be sold to private enter-
prise. The Public Land Law Review Commission recognized that where government 
policy concerning commercially valuable areas of the public lands is based solely on 
market considerations, the land should be sold. See id. at 48, 115-16. Government 
ownership of land is justified only when market imperfections prevent the private 
sector from providing desired land uses. 
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mining or industry, but it provides other benefits such as wildlife 
habitat preservation and watershed protection. The public does not 
pay the government as resource owner for these benefits because they 
are external to the recreation fee market; in other words, the supply 
and demand for recreation are largely independent of the magnitude 
of these benefits. If the IOAA is read to require the government to 
base its public land use fees upon the opportunity cost of only the 
most profitable uses, many fees would be increased, thereby rendering 
numerous low-return uses economically unfeasible.189 
The "public policy or interest served" factor of the IOAA indi-
cates that only those activities selected by the agencies should be 
relevant in determining opportunity cost. In the Multiple-Use Sus-
tained-Yield Act of 1960,19° Congress expressed its policy for public 
land management: The uses selected by the agencies need "not neces-
sarily [be] the combination of uses that will give the greatest dollar 
return."191 Thus, Congress has explicitly recognized the legitimacy 
of low-return uses. Setting fees by reference only to the most profit-
able opportunities would deprive the agencies of their discretion to 
take account of nonmarket considerations, thereby vitiating one pur-
pose of government ownership.192 
In short, the price-setting factors of the IOAA indicate that the 
agencies should be free to allocate uses on the basis of policy 
considerations; however, once they have designated a use, fees should 
be set at the full value of the use.193 
A third statute, NEPA, 194 though directed more at environmental 
than economic issues, provides indirect support for the market value 
rule by virtue of its express declaration of trust: "[It] is the continu-
ing responsibility of the Federal Government to . . . fulfill the re-
sponsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for 
succeeding generations."105 The NEPA trust is much broader than 
189. See M. CLAWSON & B. HELD, supra note 6, at 202. 
190. 16 u.s.c. §§ 528-531 (1970). 
191. 16 U.S.C. § 531(a) (1970). 
192. See note 188 supra. 
193. Cases decided under the market value rule of the Indian and school land 
trusts, see cases cited note 112 supra, have not addressed the opportunity cost issue. 
The economic policy argument developed in the text suggests that a common-law 
court applying governmental trusts should conclude that fees must be set at the full 
value of the agency designated use. 
However, the public policy factor in the IOAA and the public interest rationale 
of the public land trust require one qualification to the conclusion in the text: Subsi-
dized fees may be justified when the government has a nonproprietary objective. For 
a discussion of such exceptions to the market value rule, see notes 231-32 infra and 
accompanying text. 
194. 42 u.s.c. §§ 4321-4347 (1970). 
195. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(l) (1970). 
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the public land trust and should not be considered its codification.100 
Nevertheless, the NEPA trust demonstrates Congress' recent recog-
nition that requiring the federal government to meet fiduciary stan-
dards is an appropriate way to effectuate governmental objectives. 
Although some courts have questioned the enforceability of NEP A's 
substantive duties, 107 a majority of the circuit courts that have de-
cided the question have held that these duties should be enforced,1°8 
and several commentators have expressed support for this interpre-
tation.100 
If the NEPA trust is enforceable, it overlaps the public land trust 
to the extent that both trusts encompass the environmental aspects of 
public land administration. More specifically, in those situations 
where the government's failure to secure full value for public land 
resources leads to environmental degradation, the policy of the NEPA 
trust is coterminous with that of the public land trust. The causal 
link between resource pricing and environmental quality is found in 
the fact that subsidies to resource users create an incentive to overex-
ploit artificially cheap resources.200 The user, who gains a marginal 
benefit from every additional unit of subsidized resource, naturally 
attempts to maximize resource use, much like a consumer at a sale. 
Moreover, since the continued existence of subsidies depends upon 
uncertain political decisions, users tend to adopt a short-term perspec-
tive-that is, they ignore future productivity losses that will result 
from the current overuse. 201 
The relationship between resource pricing and environmental 
quality is particularly evident in the case of grazing. Ranchers have 
consistently opposed reductions in grazing allotments because subsi-
dized fees reward overuse. Additional livestock eat more artificially 
cheap forage, which, in tum, leads to the production of more artifi-
196. This writer has found no judicial interpretation of the NEPA trust, but 
neither the language of the Act nor its legislative history give any suggestion that 
it should be limited to the scope of the public land trust. 
197. See Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1282 (9th Cir. 1974); 
Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677, 692 (9th Cir. 1974); National Helium Corp. v. 
Morton, 455 F.2d 650, 656 (10th Cir. 1971). 
198. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the United 
States Army, 492 F.2d 1123, 1139-40 (5th Cir. 1974); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486 
F.2d 946, 952 (7th Cir. 1973); Conservation Council v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664, 664-
65 ( 4th Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the 
United States Army, 470 F.2d 289, 297-301 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 
931 (1973). 
199. See, e.g., Cohen & Warren, Judicial Recognition of the Substantive Require-
ments of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 13 B.C. IND. & COM. L. 
RE.v. 685, 691-94 (1972); Robie, Recognition of Substantive Rights Under NEPA, 
7 NAT. RESOURCES LAw. 387, 436-37 (1974); Note, Program Environmental Impact 
Statements: Review and Remedies, 75 MICH. L. REV. 107, 130-31 (1976). 
200. 'See note 98 supra. 
201. See S. CnuAcY-WANTRUP, supra note 98, at 136. 
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cially cheap meat that can be sold at normal market prices. 202 The 
graziers have opposed allotment reductions as successfully as they 
have resisted fee increases. 203 As a result, most of the federal range 
is seriously overgrazed. 
The relationship between resource price and environmental qual-
ity has been recognized in a federal district court case. In Pyramid 
Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 204 the court ordered the 
Secretary of the Interior to charge an irrigation district for the fed-
erally subsidized water it uses, reasoning that this remedy would "pro-
vide a reasonable financial incentive for economical and efficient use 
of water."205 · 
The fact that NEPA does not address the question of resource 
pricing directly is insignificant, since NEPA was enacted to provide a 
general environmental policy,200 and market value pricing is a means 
of effectuating that policy. Thus, the NEPA trust-as well as section 
102(a) (9) of the FLPMA207 and the IOAA208-reinforces the fair 
market value rule of the public land trust. It may be questioned 
whether the market value requirement embodied in these statutes is 
sufficiently explicit to be judicially enforced, but the direct legal effect 
of the statutes is not at issue here. These enactments are significant 
because they further congressional policies that coincide with the 
judicial policies advanced by the public land trust. 
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Thus far, this Note has demonstrated that the public land trust is 
a potentially effective tool for shaping public land management pol-
icy. It has documented the existence of the trust and described its 
role. In particular, this Note has focused on the duty of the federal 
government as trustee to secure fair market value for the sale or lease 
of public land resources. However, because social policy is the 
ultimate justification for the public land trust, the courts should not 
execute it unless they determine that the specific policies it would 
implement are meritorious. 
202. Ranchers also have opposed allotment reductions because grazing rights are 
a transferable property right. See 43 C.F.R. § 4115.2-2 (1976). The value of this 
property right is a function of the number of animal-unit-months that the permit 
entitles its holder to utilize. Therefore, any reduction in this allotment of animal-
unit-months decreases the capital value of the permit. See W. CALEF, supra note 95, 
at 135-40. 
203. See W. CALEF, supra note 95, at 136-40; P. Foss, supra note 89, at 64-65, 
140-70. 
204. 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973). 
205. 354 F. Supp. at 265. 
206. See 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970). 
207. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1702(a) (9) (Pamphlet No. 4, pt. 3, Dec. 1976). 
208. 31 U.S.C. § 483a (1970). 
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Market value pricing, which is the most important of the trust's 
substantive requirements,2°0 has the potential to create numerous 
problems, such as increased consumer prices, hardships for low-
income resource users, destruction of capitalized permit values, and 
conflicts with other public land policies. The remainder of this Note 
will discuss these possible problems and will conclude that whatever 
disadvantages the fair market value rule might generate are out-
weighed by the benefits that will be realized by execution of the trust. 
It is plausible that an increase in the prices charged by the govern-
ment for the use of public land resources might be passed on to con-
sumers, resulting in no net social benefit. 210 This result is unlikely, 
however, because the market for almost every kind of resource that 
is available on public land is dominated by more plentiful private land 
resources. 211 Hence, the market price for any resource is controlled 
by changes in the private market. Consumers, therefore, would not be 
adversely affected by increases in the fees charged to users of public 
land resources. 
A second possible adverse effect of the market value pricing rule 
is that low-income users might be disadvantaged. 212 It is argued that 
209. The existence of the trust is itself important, aside from its specific sub• 
stantive requirements, because it provides the judicial branch of the government with 
an established common-law mechanism with which to protect diffuse public interests 
against well-organized minorities that distort the political process. See text at notes 
240-41 infra. 
210. If increased fees were passed on to consumers, the immediate effect would 
be to increase both government revenues and consumer prices, resulting in a net 
transfer from private consumers to the government. If the government made a cor• 
responding tax cut, the net effect of increased prices on both the government and 
consumers would be zero, aside from possible income redistribution among consumers 
and taxpayers. 
211. The federal lands contain 35 per cent of the nation's known reserves of oil 
and gas and 50 per cent of its coal reserves. See FoRD FOUNDATION, supra note 2, 
at 29. Livestock on the federal range consume only three per cent of all the forage 
consumed by livestock in the United States. PLLRC, supra note 1, at 105. Public 
land timber production is about 40 per cent of the national total. See id. at 92. 
212. There is a third argument, based on antitrust considerations, which has 
played a role of varying importance throughout the history of the public lands. See 
Causey v. United States, 240 U.S. 399, 402 (1961); P. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC 
LAND LAw DEVELOPMENT 765, 770-71 (1968); PLLRC supra note 1, at 36. In gen-
eral, the antitrust argument contends that the government should encourage small 
operations through the subsidy, because otherwise the vast expanse of the public lands 
might fall under the control of a small number of monopolists. However, pricing 
government-owned resources at market value should not increase this danger in com-
petitive industries because the theory of perfect competition assumes market pricing, 
See R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, supra note 98, at 269. 
Of the two major industries that purchase public land resources, agriculture and 
mineral extraction, the former is considered to be fully competitive, see Boulding, 
Agriculture: Problems of a Competitive Industry in MICROECONOMICS 238, 238-39 
(E. Mansfield ed. 1975), but the latter may have significant anticompetitive features 
in its market structure. Thus, market value resource pricing could threaten antitrust 
policy only in the mineral extraction industry. Even here, however, present mineral 
sale and leasing laws do not meaningfully restrict the amount that an extractor may 
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subsidies for public land use benefit such users in two ways. First, 
because private land resources, as noted above, usually dominate the 
market for public land resources, public land users are able to sell 
their resources at what are, in effect, private market prices and pocket. 
the . windfall. 213 Such an outcome might have a desirable welfare 
effect if most public land subsidies did in fact benefit the poor. This 
is not the case, however, as evidenced by the fact that over fifty per 
cent of public land grazing rights are held by only five per cent of the 
graziers. 214 Second, it is argued as an alternative to the "windfall" 
contention that the subsidy enables users to exploit resources that 
would otherwise be too expensive to use, and that some of these 
marginal users are poor people who need governmental assistance. 215 
The public land resource subsidy, however, is not a desirable form of 
welfare because such subsidies cause land, labor, and capital to be 
artifically channelled into excessive production. 216 Regardless of 
which argument is used to justify these subsidies as a benefit for low-
income users, most economists agree that to help the poor fairly and 
acquire, see, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 184 (1970); therefore, the government's failure to se-
cure full value from mineral extraction neither aids small entities nor handicaps large 
ones. 
Finally, one must question whether public land resource pricing is a realistic way 
to approach the broad problem of monopoly that intersects publicJand management 
in no systematic manner. 
213. See generally Sax, Selling Reclamation Water Rights: A Case Study in Fed-
eral Subsidy Policy, 64 MICH. L. REV. 13, 13-14 (1965); Boulding, supra note 212, 
at 246. However, there is no windfall if the public land user purchases his right to 
use subsidized public land resources from a _prior private user; he must use the differ-
ence between market prices and subsidized prices in order to amortize the price of 
his purchase. See text at notes 219-26 infra. Of course, in this situation, there was 
a windfall to the seller of the permit but he is no longer in a situation in which the 
windfall can be recovered. 
214. 1969 House Hearings, supra note 20, at 119. This figure applies only to 
the public lands under BLM jurisdiction. 
Even if public land subsidies were restricted to low-income users,. such a program 
could not be effective because all agriculturally valuable public land is already com-
mitted to other uses. See PLLRC, supra note 1, at 177-7·8. 
215. See 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 96, at 31-32. The subsidy allows the 
use of resources at a low cost only to the extent that the subsidy has not been cap-
italized; otherwise the benefit of the subsidy must be set aside to amortize the pur-
chase price of the permit. See note 213 supra. As of 1968, only one third of BLM 
grazing permits were in the hands of original owners, see 1969 House Hearings, supra 
note 20, at 97, 117; thus, the subsidy is available to at most one third of BLM per-
mittees. Within this one third, some are probably efficient operations that are able 
to pocket the subsidy. Therefore, less than one third of the graziers operating on 
BLM land are marginal operations in need of governmental assistance. Even if one 
accepts the goal of encouraging marginal operations, which this Note does not, see 
text at notes 216-18 infra, it is evident that the present subsidy system is a very in-
efficient means of reaching the goal, since it is effective in less than one third of 
all cases. 
216. See R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, supra note 98, at 120-27. The production is 
excessive in the sense that it causes more production than consumers would voluntar-
ily purchase at a price determined by supply and demand, 
622 Michigan Law Review LVol. 75:586 
efficiently, "[a]n income support program should be geared to peo-
ple, not commodities."217 Moreover, there is no justification for 
subsidizing only public land users, for competing private users may 
also be poor. 218 
A third possible disadvantage of market value pricing is its effect 
on those who purchased the right to use the public land from a 
private party instead of directly from the government. This is parti-
cularly evident in the case of public land grazing. The graziers' 
argument for continued reduced fees is based on the fact that long 
ago sellers of grazing permits, which are transferable, 210 recognized 
that the right to cheap grazing has value. Most present users 
purchased their permits from the original owners at considerable 
cost. 220 This cost, which is called the "permit value," is approximately 
equal to the capitalized value of the fee subsidy. (The subsidy is 
the difference between market value fees and government fees, and 
the capitalized value of the fee subsidy is the amount of money that a 
person would have to invest in order to earn a yearly return equal to 
the amount of the subsidy.)221 When a purchaser of a grazing 
permit follows the general practice of financing the purchase of his 
permit by mortgaging it,222 the annual interest on the mortgage 
roughly corresponds to the amount of the subsidy.223 Thus, the 
combination of his grazing fee and the payments on his permit 
mortgage approximates the market value of the forage. 224 Conse-
217. C. McCONNELL, ECONOMICS 699 (1975); accord, Boulding, supra note 212, 
at 247. See also S. CIRIACY-WANTRUP, supra note 98, at 136 ("[S]upport of a re-
source user's income, especially in the low-income groups, is a more effective form 
of public assistance-at least from the standpoint of resource conservation-than sup-
port of product prices"). 
218. Cf. 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 96, at 148 ("As one rancher with no 
public lands [said], 'I get socked twice by the low public land grazing fee. Not only 
do I have to compete against low-priced grass, but my private lands have to carry 
higher taxes because there are no taxes coming from the public lands'"). 
219. See 43 C.F.R. § 4115.2-2 (1976). 
220. In 1968, estimates of the capitalized value of one animal-unit-month of 
grazing rights varied from $14 for BLM permits to $25 for Forest Service permits. 
The total capitalized value of grazing rights on the public lands was estimated to be 
$343 million. See 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 96, at 12. However, as of 1968 
about one third of the BLM permits had never been sold. Id. at 141. 
221. For example, if the market value of one animal-unit-month of forage is 
$1.94 while grazing fees are $1.51, the subsidy equals 43 cents. See note 97 supra. 
If a rancher could get 10 per cent interest on alternative investments, the capitalized 
value of the right to 43 cents per year would be $0.43/.10 = $4.30. In other words, 
$4.30 invested at 10 per cent per annum would yield 43 cents per year. 
222. See 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 96, at 186-87. 
223. For example, if a rancher could borrow as well as invest at 10 per cent inter-
est, see note 221 supra, his annual interest payment on a mortage of $4.30 would 
be 43 cents, the same amount that his investment in the permit is saving him. 
224. In the example used in notes 221 and 223 supra, the interest payment of 
43 cents plus the grazing fee of $1.51 equals the market value of the forage, $1.94. 
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quently, the typical public range grazier is no better off than the 
grazier who uses private forage, and the primary beneficiaries of the 
subsidy are the early ranchers who received a permit from the govern-
ment and sold it at market value, pocketing the proceeds. 225 Not 
surprisingly, the ranchers contend that requiring them to pay fees at 
full market value to the government while also paying the yearly 
amortization on a nonexistent subsidy would be harsh and unfair. This 
would cause public land users to have higher costs than their competi-
tors on private lands and might, it is argued, force some of them into 
bankruptcy. 226 
This argument advanced by the public land graziers is economi-
cally valid and may arouse sympathy. Nevertheless, in Pankey Land 
and Cattle Co. v. Hardin,221 the Tenth Circuit wisely rejected it and 
upheld an increase in grazing fees: "Although the permits are valu-
able to the ranchers, they are not an interest protected by the Fifth 
Amendment against the taking by the Government who granted them 
with the understanding that they could be withdrawn . . . without the 
payment of compensation."228 When the graziers bought permits at 
their capitalized values, they were merely gambling that the govern-
ment's fees would not increase. The level of fees has varied over the 
years and the agencies have never represented that this level would 
remain below market value. Indeed, the controversy over fees, 
which was well publicized in the western states, should have warned 
225. See 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 96, at 213. See also Sax, supra note 
213, at 32-33. 
226. See 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at 18. The same argument could 
be made by other subsidized public land users. For example, there is evidence that 
the government has not received market value royalties on some coal mining leases. 
See FORD FOUNDATION, supra note 87, at 288-91. These leases are transferable and 
the transferee pays the same royalty rate that the transferor paid. See 43 C.F.R. 
§ 3506.1 (1976). Every 20 years, the government may renegotiate the royalty. 
30 U.S.C. § 207 (1970). If the government seeks at that time to fix royalties at 
market value, the transferee might protest that he had already paid the difference be-
tween market value royalties and the existing royalty by purchasing the lease at its 
capitalized value. Economically, this is identical to the grazing situation. 
In general, the principles of gains from trade suggest that over a period of time 
any transferable subsidy will tend to be capitalized, and, consequently, such subsidies 
should be eliminated at the earliest possible opportunity. 
227. 427 F.2d 43 (10th Cir. 1970). 
228. 427 F.2d at 45, quoting United States v. Cox, 190 F.2d 293, 296 (10th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 867 (1951); cf. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973). 
Fuller was an eminent domain case in which the government condemned property 
that had special value because of its use in conjunction with leases issued under the 
Taylor Grazing Act. The Court denied the condemnee's argument that the value of 
his property included this special value, holding that as a general rule "the Govern-
ment as condemnor may not be required to compensate a condemnee for elements 
of value that the Government has created." 409 U.S. at 492. The Court also noted 
that "[t]he provisions of the Taylor Grazing Act . . . make clear the congressional 
intent that no compensable property right be created in the permit lands themselves 
as a result of the issuance of the permit." 409 U.S. at 494. 
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any purchaser that many people wanted the fees to be raised. 220 The 
Tenth Circuit, in essence, viewed the ranchers as losers on a gamble, 
with no more right to judicial protection than unlucky speculators in 
private sector commodities. 230 
Finally, it might be argued that market value pricing would 
adversely affect nonproprietary objectives of public land ownership, 
such as conservation231 and outdoor recreation. 232 The essence of 
229. See generally note 96 supra. 
230. 427 F.2d at 45. Since all investors take risks, it would constitute improper 
favoritism for the government to guarantee the return for only this small segment 
of the nation's investors. The fact that the ranchers' interests are in public rather 
than private property should not enhance their case. Even Charles Reich, who 
advocated increased protection of rights in the governmental largess, was concerned 
chiefly with selective forfeitures and with fundamental benefits such as social security 
and unemployment compensation. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 
783-87 (1964). 
231. Whether conservation practices on the public lands have a nonproprietary 
objective must be determined by reference to the factors set forth in note 120 supra. 
These factors suggest that conservation of the public lands is a sovereign goal. First, 
the government characterizes conservation as having nonproprietary objectives, such 
as protecting "the quality of scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, 
air and atmospheric, water resource, and archeological values." Federal land 
Policy and Management Act of 1976 § 102(a) (8), 43 U.S.C.A. ,§ 1701 (a) (8) 
(•Pamphlet No. 4, pt. 3, Dec. 1976); see PLLRC, supra note 1, at 36. Second, there 
is no competing private market for the benefits of conservation. Third, although the 
"users" of conservation are difficult to identify because the benefits resulting from 
public land conservation practices diffuse broadly, they are not primarily commercial 
users. Finally, the diffusion of benefits demonstrates that it is not feasible to fund 
conservation through proprietary techniques. Proprietary pricing requires that non-
buyers be excluded from enjoying the benefit of the commodity. In the case of con-
servation, this is not possible because of the uncontrollable diffusion of conservation 
benefits, such as the air that is oxygenated and detoxified by public land vegetation. 
For this reason, conservation is typically considered to be a "public good" that is 
more efficiently financed by tax revenues than by user fees. See Steiner, Public Ex-
penditure Budgeting in THE EcoNOMICS OF PUBLIC FINANCE 241, 251 (1974). Tax 
funding may be less equitable than user fees because there is no inherent correlation 
between tax payments and conservation benefits, but the wide distribution of these 
benefits minimizes this inequity. 
232. In light of the factors discussed in note 120 supra, the determination that 
outdoor recreation on the public lands has a nonproprietary rather than a proprietary 
governmental objective is problematic. Nevertheless, with regard to the market 
value rule of the public land trust, it can be concluded that a significant portion of 
the outdoor recreation allowed on the public lands has a nonproprietary objective. 
First, the government characterizes outdoor recreation as having a nonproprietary ob-
jective. See Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965, 16 U.S.C. §§ 460/-
4, 460/-6a(a), 460/-6a(c) (1970). Second, there is no significant private market for 
the type of outdoor recreation commonly engaged in on the public lands-diffuse ac-
tivity on largely undeveloped sites. For a breakdown of public land recreational 
activities, see p.s. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, supra note 1, at 80 (BLM land); 
U.S. FOREST SERVICE, supra note 4, at 14-17 (Forest Service land). However, where 
recreational use of the public lands involves developed sites, such as full service 
campgrounds, competing private markets exist and proprietary treatment is appropri-
ate. See 16 U.S.C. § 4601-6a(b) (1970). This is particularly important because the 
government should not undercut the growth of private sources of recreation. See M. 
CLAWSON & J. KNE:rsc:H, ECONOMICS OF OUTDOOR RECREATION 315 (1966). Third, 
virtually all recreational users of the public lands are noncommercial, a fact that is 
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this contention is that, if prices are determined solely on the basis of 
proprietary considerations, nonproprietary goals might be frustrated. 
However, this argument is inapt; because the public land trust regu-
lates only proprietary activities, 233 nonproprietary goals will not be 
impaired. 
The potential disadvantages of the fair market value rule either 
fail to materialize or can be resolved satisfactorily. On the other 
hand, the benefits of market value pricing are substantial. First, 
market value pricing would increase governmental revenues. The 
increase that would result from raising grazing fees, for example, is 
small when compared to total federal revenues, but it is significant in 
absolute dollar terms.234 In the case of coal or water, the revenue 
gains could be very substantial. 235 Second, market value prices 
consistent with sovereign management. See text at note 82 supra. Finally, although 
economic theory does not clearly indicate a nonproprietary objective behind the gov-
ernment's allowing recreational use of the public lands, it supports the nonproprietary 
status of recreational use in regard to the market value rule of the public land trust. 
The economic analysis of the proper characterization of outdoor recreation on the 
public lands ultimately turns on the extent to which "outdoor recreation has broad 
social effects, in that those who do not partake of it nevertheless benefit because 
others do engage in it." M. CLAWSON & J. KNETSCH, supra, at 69. Unfortunately, 
there is very little empirical evidence on this question. Id. at 267-68. Because courts 
are not institutionally equipped to resolve such an empirical issue, and because they 
do.not have the electoral mandate to decide such broad policy questions without em-
pirical support, they should be particularly receptive to the congressional character-
ization of outdoor recreation as a nonproprietary commodity. 
An additional, and frequently advanced, argument for the sovereign status of out-
door recreation is that recreation fees fixed by proprietary standards might exclude 
low-income citizens. See, e.g., D. DUCSIK, SHORELINE FOR THE PUBLIC 70-71 (1974). 
However, this argument should not be relied upon in characterizing outdoor recrea-
tion as a sovereign use of the public lands. First, it is questionable that the very 
poor can ever afford to visit the public lands. See Clawson, supra note 2, at 55, 
58, 84-87. More importantly, as noted previously in the text, it is desirable to sup-
port incomes rather than commodity prices. See text at note 217 supra. 
233. See text at notes 77-86 supra. Note also that the trust does not provide 
authority for interference with use allocation, whether proprietary or nonproprietary, 
so long as the allocation is based upon a rational policy decision. See text at notes 
190-92 supra. 
234. In 1976, the revenue loss due to low grazing fees was approximately $7.5 
million. This figure is determined by multiplying the amount of the subsidy, $0.43 
per animal-unit-month, see note 221 supra, times the number of animal-unit-months 
used, 17.5 million. (Although 1976 data is not available, use has remained constant 
for several years). See U.S. FOREST SERVICE, supra note 4, at 28 (7.2 million AUMs 
on Forest Service land); U.S. Bureau of Land Management, supra note 1, at 90 (10.4 
million AUMs on BLM land). 
235. Over 15 billion tons of recoverable public land coal are presently under lease 
and another 187 billion tons of estimated reserves remain untouched. FORD FOUN-
DATION, supra note 87, at 271, 290. There is evidence that present government prac-
tices do not ensure market value return on federal coal. See note 226 supra. Ob-
viously, therefore, even slight changes in the price per ton of coal that the govern-
ment receives will have a great impact on present and future revenues. As for water, 
the 1949 value of the water flowing from Forest Service land was estimated at $300 
million, none of which the Forest Service received. See U.S. FOREST SERVICE, RE-
PORT OF THE CHIEF 42 (1949). This value is probably considerably greater today. 
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would eliminate the incentive to overuse artificially cheap re-
sources, 236 thereby alleviating such problems as overgrazing. Finally, 
the market value rule would eliminate the windfall that present 
policies extend to those fortunate enough to receive the subsidy, a 
class that is arbitarily selected without regard to need. 237 
There is no reason to fear that the market value rule will handicap 
the government's ability to respond to future social needs because two 
sources of flexibility are inherent in the trust. The fair market value 
rule, because it is a common-law doctrine, is subject to judicial 
modification. 238 In addition, Congress retains authority to modify 
the rule by statute. 289 Such flexibility is necessary since changing 
conditions may require adjustments in pricing policy. Indeed, it 
would not be desirable at the present time to apply the fair market 
value rule to all resources, as demonstrated by the recreation and 
conservation exceptions. In short, the fair market value rule is 
sufficiently flexible to accommodate future needs. 
The fair market value rule is good policy, which is one indication 
that the public land trust itself is good policy. Yet one important 
justification for the trust transcends its specific content: Fundamen-
tally, the public land trust is a sophisticated means of dealing with 
special interest groups whose power is well-suited to using the legisla-
tive and administrative process to their own advantage. The influ-
ence of these minorities has skewed the political process, and neither 
the legislature nor the agencies possess the means-nor, in many 
cases, the will-to rectify the political imbalance. This situation 
suggests the need for judicial intervention. It might be argued that 
judicial action is inappropriate because it usurps legislative preroga-
tives. However, the trust is not constitutionally based and the legisla-
ture retains the power to make land management decisions; indeed, 
through express statutory language, the legislature can repudiate the 
trust's standards. Even if ultimately overridden, the judicial role in 
the execution of the trust can nonetheless be extremely important, for 
it will force Congress to confront land management issues squarely. 240 
In addition, it will stimulate agencies to base policy decisions on 
principle rather than on political power. 241 In short, execution of the 
public land trust will not only protect the public interest by preserving 
the resources of the public lands; it will also enhance the rationality 
and integrity of the government's decision-making process. 
236. See note 98 supra. 
237. See note 108 supra. 
238. See B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 102-05 (1921). 
239. See text at note 39 supra. 
240. See text at note 49 supra. 
241. See text at notes 141-43 supra. 
